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Stevenson et al.: Rights And Freedom

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION
SandraM. Stevenson:
We are so fortunate to have Professor Eve Cary from Brooklyn
Law School, Professor Helen Hershkoff from NYU Law School,
Professor Mary Falk from Brooklyn Law School, and our own
Rob Heverly, Assistant Director of the Government Law Center.
We are so proud to have all of them here.
I will turn it over to Eve Cary.
Eve Cary:*
My colleague, Mary Falk, and I became state constitutional
groupies a couple of years ago kind of by accident when we
wrote an article1 about People v. Scott and People v. Keta. 2 We
* Ms. Cary and Ms. Falk are Associate Professors of Legal Writing at
Brooklyn Law School. Ms. Cary and Ms. Falk received their J.D. degrees
from New York University School of Law and their B.A. degrees from Sarah
Lawrence College.
1. Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott & People v. Keta:
"DemocracyBegins In Conversation,"58 BROOK. L. REv. 1279 (1993).
2. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). In
Scott, the New York Court of Appeals held that "where landowners fence or
post 'No Trespassing' signs on their property or, by some other means,
indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the expectation that their
privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free from unwanted
intrusions is reasonable." Id. at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at
930. Thus, the court of appeals rejected the "open fields doctrine" reconfirmed
in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), where the United States
Supreme Court found warrantless searches of posted or fenced land to be
constitutional. Id. at 482, 593 N.E.2d at 1333, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 925. Relying
on article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution, the court of appeals reasoned
that Oliver did "not adequately protect fundamental constitutional rights."
Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 478, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. See N.Y.
CoNsT. art. I, § 12. This section provides in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
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were struck in that decision by its peculiar duality. There was the
temperate, reasoned discussion of the basic search and seizure
issue, then all of a sudden the bizarre explosion in the middle,
with accusations going back and forth about the correct method
of constitutional adjudication.
I think what really struck us was not so much what the correct
method of state constitutional analysis should be, but rather the
opposite sides of the court. Judge Bellacosa and Judge Kaye
seemed to disagree entirely about what the court had done in the
past. Judge Bellacosa said that the court has always adopted noninterpretive analysis. 3 whereas Judge Kaye found that the court
has not adhered to any fixed methodology. 4 Ms. Falk and I
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... but upon
probable cause . . . ." Id.

In Keta, the New York Court of Appeals struck down the New York statute
"which authorize[d] the police to conduct random warrantless searches of
vehicle dismantling businesses to determine whether such businesses are
trafficking in stolen automobile parts." Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 593
N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 931. The court of appeals, relying on article
I, § 12 of the New York Constitution, explicitly rejected New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court found that
Vehicle and Traffic Law 415-a(5)(a) did not violate the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against unreasonable search and seizures. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at
491-92, 593 N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 931. In acknowledging a state's
power to interpret the provisions of its constitution "as providing greater
protections than their Federal counterparts," both the Scott and Keta decisions
made reference to the Supreme Court's designation of states as "the primary
guardian[s] of the liberty of the people." Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 496, 505, 593
N.E.2d at 1341-42, 1347-48, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 933-34, 939-40 (citing
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 739 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
3. Id. at 513, 593 N.E.2d at 1353, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). Judge Bellaoca advocated that where a federal and state
constitutional provision are identical, "there should be '[s]ufficient reasons'
• . . for disagreeing before we construe the State provision in a manner
different from the construction placed on its Federal counterpart by the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 509, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
Judge Bellacosa warned that "inasmuch as the court's self-imposed noninterpretive analysis has now been effectively scuttled by [Scott and Keta],
New York's adjudicative process is left bereft of any external or internal
doctrinal disciplines." Id. at 517, 593 N.E.2d at 1355, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
4. Id. at 504, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (Kaye, C.J.,
concurring). "We must of course be faithful to our precedents ....
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examined the precedents relied upon by the court, however we
could not determine what method of state constitutional
interpretation the court had been following.
In fact, the whole notion of non-interpretive analysis just sort
of seeped in. They kept saying that they had said things in
previous cases that it did not appear to us that they had said at
all. Thus, we concluded that, irrespective of which method is
best, the New York Court of Appeals should adopt and articulate
a particular method. The court has left litigators and judges
without a clear direction upon which to raise a state constitutional
issue.
Our second article addressed the death penalty. 5 In some
respects it is a continuation of the first article, 6 but it is directed
to the most recent controversial issue in the state, the death
penalty. Capital punishment is a subject about which there has
been an enormous amount of federal litigation, and it will be
particularly interesting to try to predict how the New York Court
of Appeals would handle these issues. It is our predictions that
we wanted to discuss today. A discussion about the death penalty
in New York State must begin by addressing the federal floor.
There are four or five important cases that basically outline the
7
federal floor on the death penalty.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia.8 In
Furnan, the Court did not reach the question of whether the
where we conclude that the Supreme Court has changed course and diluted
constitutional principles, I cannot agree that we act improperly in discharging

our responsibility to support the State Constitution. . .
N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939.

."

Id. at 504, 593

5. Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional
Challenges To New York's Death Penally, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 161 (1995).

6. See supra note 1.
7. See ifra notes 8-33 and accompanying text.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman was a consolidation of three cases
which presented the question: "'Does the imposition and carrying out of the

death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments[J.]'" Id. at 239 (citations
omitted). See Furman v. Georgia, 167 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. 1969); Jackson v.
State, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.
1969). See also U.S. CONST. amend VIII. This provision states in pertinent
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death penalty is per se unconstitutional, 9 but it did strike down
the death penalty statutes that were before it.10 Furthermore, the
decision resulted in the nullification of death penalty statutes in
thirty-nine states. 11 Basically, the Court concluded that these
statutes were unconstitutional because they resulted in the wanton
and freakish imposition of death. Thus, the Court's decision
established that in order for a capital sentencing statute to be
constitutional, at a minimum, the death penalty had to be
imposed consistently and it also had to be individualized, taking
into consideration the individual circumstances of the crime and
the particular defendant. 12
In the next case, Gregg v. Georgia,13 the Supreme Court
reached the decision that it had left open in Furman, holding that
part: "[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. This provision states in pertinent part: "No state shall ...

deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. In a
brief per curium opinion, the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments were indeed violated in these cases. Id. at 240.
9. Id. at 311-12. Each of the nine Justices wrote separate opinions.
Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White and
Thurgood Marshall concurred. Id. at 240. Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist dissented. Id.
at 240. However, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concluded that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of death "for all crimes and under
all circumstances." Id. at 375 (Burger, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 417.
11. Id. Additionally, the decision "remove[d] the death sentences
previously imposed on some 600 persons awaiting punishment in state and
federal prisons throughout the country." Id.
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
13. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the defendant was charged with armed
robbery and murder. Id. at 158. Georgia utilizes a bifurcated trial in capital
cases, consisting of a guilt stage and a sentencing stage. Id. In the guilt phase,
the jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of armed robbery and two
counts of murder. Id. at 160. In the penalty phase, the jury, after finding two
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, returned verdicts of
death on each count. Id. at 161. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed both the
convictions and the death sentences for the murders. Id. However, the court
vacated the death sentences for armed robbery on the grounds, inter alia, that
"the death penalty had rarely been imposed in Georgia for that offense." Id. at
161-62. The defendant petitioned the Court for certiorari contending that the
imposition of death in his case violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
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the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional under all
circumstances. 14 The Court then went on to suggest a procedure
for implementing the consistency and individualization standards
15
mandated in Furman.

The Court found that "a bifurcated system is ...

likely to

ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in

Furman."16 This system would comprise a guilt/non-guilt
determination stage, and then an entirely separate sentencing
stage. Bifurcation of the trial allows relevant information to be

presented at the sentencing stage that might have been
inadmissible at the guilt stage, so that a rational sentence is
imposed. 17
The Gregg Court also dealt with a number of state legislative

acts that were enacted to comport with the Court's consistency

requirement by passing mandatory death sentences. 18 The Court
referred to

Woodson v. North Carolina19 and Roberts v.

Amendments. Id. at 162. The Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. at 207.
14. Id. at 169.
15. Id. at 199. The Gregg Court found that "[a]s a general proposition
these concerns [expressed in Furman] are best met by a system that provides
for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards
to guide its use of the information." Id. at 195. However, the Court noted that
"each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis." Id.
16. Id. at 191-92.
17. Id. The Court stated that "it [is] desirable for the jury to have as much
information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision." Id. at
204. Thus, the Court found that "[slo long as the evidence introduced and the
arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is
preferable not to impose restrictions." Id. at 203-04. However, the Court also
noted that since jurors are unlikely to have prior "experience in sentencing,
they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given."
Id. at 192. Nonetheless, the Court found that this "problem will be alleviated
if the jury is guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant
that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to
the sentencing decision." Id.
18. Id. at 199 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)).
19. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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Louisiana,20 which were decided on the same day as Gregg. In
Woodson and Roberts, the Court held that mandatory death
21
penalty statutes were unconstitutional.
In Coker v. Georgia,22 the Court held that a sentence of death
for the crime of rape where a life has not been taken would be
"grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment," and thus
unconstitutional. 23
In Enmund v. Florida,24 a 1982 case, the Court stated that the
death penalty could not be imposed in the case of a nonintentional felony murder. 25 The Court found that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the "imposition of ...death ...on
one ...

who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a

murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, or
intend to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal
force will be employed."

26

20. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
21. Accordingly, the Court struck down the mandatory death penalty
statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305;
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.
22. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, the jury found the defendant guilty of
escape, armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping and rape. Id. at 587.
The death sentence was imposed for the rape. Id.
23. The Court found that the Eighth Amendment proscribes not only
"barbaric" punishments, "but also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the
crime committed." Id. at 591-92. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII. This
provision states in pertinent part: "[N]or cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Id.
24. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund, defendant was found guilty of first
degree murder and robbery and was sentenced to death. Id. at 785. Two
elderly victims were robbed and killed in their farmhouse. Id. at 784-85.
25. Id. at 797.
26. Id. The trial court and the Florida Supreme Court had opposing views
regarding defendant's participation. Id. at 786 n.2. The trial court found that
defendant was the triggerman, but the Florida Supreme Court held that "the
only supportable inference with respect to defendant's participation was that he
drove the getaway car." Id. The difference was of no consequence "since the
Florida Supreme Court held that driving the escape car was enough to
warrant ...the death penalty, whether or not the defendant intended that life
be taken or anticipated that lethal force be used." Id. The United States
Supreme Court, in overturning defendant's death sentence, stated that "[t]he
focus must be on [defendant's] culpability, not... those who ... shot the
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The final case, and one which I believe is extremely important,
is McCleskey v. Kemp. 27 McCleskey was a challenge to the
Georgia death penalty process on the grounds that it was

"administered in a racially discriminatory manner," in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 8 Defendant relied on a statistical

study of over two thousand death penalty cases that occurred in
Georgia during a ten year period. 29 The study concluded that not
only were black murderers more likely to be given the death

penalty than white murderers, but also that the murderers of
white people were more likely to receive the death penalty than
the murderers of black people. 3 0 Thus, statistically, there was

enormous discrepancy in capital sentencing based on race.
However, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's claim on the
grounds that he did not prove purposeful discrimination in his
own case. 3 1 Such proof is virtually impossible to obtain in any
case. The Court stated that race discrimination in criminal
victims, for we insist on 'individualized consideration as a constitutional
requirement in imposing the death sentence.. .

.'"

Id. at 799 (citing Lockett

v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
Subsequently, the Court refined the culpability standard set forth in Enmund
by holding that "major participation in the felony committed, combined with
reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Ennmund
culpability requirement." Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
27. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
28. Id. at 286. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision states in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " Id. The New York Criminal
Procedure Law requires the court of appeals, upon the request of the
defendant, to "review whether the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by virtue of the race of
the defendant or a victim for which the defendant was convicted .... " N.Y.
ChUM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(2)(b) (McKinney 1995).
29. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. The study was performed by Professors
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski and George Woodworth. Id.
30. Id. at 286-87.
31. Id. at 297. The Court stated that for defendant "to prevail under the
Equal Protection Clause, [he] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case
acted with discriminatory purpose." Id. at 292 (emphasis added). However,
the Court held that "the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an
inference that any of the decisionmakers in defendant's case acted with
discriminatory purpose." Id. at 297.
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sentencing is inevitable, 32 and, thus, it was willing to accept
some statistical race discrimination without finding a
33
constitutional violation.
While these cases were waning their way through the Court,
the Court was, at the same time, deciding dozens of other cases,
and spending an inordinate amount of time on death penalty
cases. 34 Finally, the Court balked and said, "We have had
enough of this. It is not appropriate for us to be intervening in an
issue that is so very much part of state jurisprudence. We should
32. Id. at 312-13. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (noting
that "[b]ecause of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to
); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 162 (1994)
operate... ...
(noting that voir dire regarding racial biases is ultimately ineffective since
jurors themselves are unaware of their biases and thus are unable to respond
truthfully to questions posed to them during the voir dire process) (Scalia, I.,
dissenting).
33. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13. The Court noted that "any mode for
determining guilt or punishment 'has its weakness and the potential for
misuse.'" Id. at 313 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965)).
Nonetheless, the Court found that "[tjhe discrepancy indicated by the Baldus
study [was] 'a far cry from the major systematic defects identified in
Furman."' McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313. But see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141, 1153 (1994) (stating that "[e]ven under the most sophisticated death
penalty statutes, race continues to play a major role in determining who shall
live and who shall die") (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Stephen B. Bright,
Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discriminationin
Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995) (stating
that "race and poverty continue to determine who dies"); Stephen B. Bright,
Counsel For The Poor: The Death Sentence Not For the Worst Crime But For
The Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (arguing that "[p]oor
people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the
skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters").
34. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-29 (1980) (questioning
whether murder is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman");
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988) (questioning whether
murder is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"); Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (questioning whether the Eight Amendment is a per se
bar prohibiting the admission of victim impact statements at the sentencing
phase of capital trials); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)
(questioning whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the
insane).
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not be intervening just to prevent the states from allow the death
penalty."
This was occurring during the period of the new federalism
enthusiasm and the general cutting back of rights and delegating
back to the states a lot of these questions. So, here we have a
clear invitation by the Supreme Court to the state courts to do it
themselves. "Don't bother us and habeas corpus anymore. This is
35
up to the states."
Thus, I think that the situation we see ourselves in at this
moment is one where the state court must determine what its
death penalty jurisprudence will be. Thus, an awful lot of issues
remain unclear.
What we, Mary Falk and I, have been analyzing is how death
penalty cases might be litigated in the New York Court of
Appeals, what is likely to happen, and what types of arguments
ought to be made. Basically, we have concluded that more
research will be required if the court decides to apply a noninterpretive analysis; local, state, empirical evidence could be
very important in litigating these issues. This will be true on both
sides.
I think our bias in the article creeps through, and we might as
well admit that we oppose the death penalty. However, we also
believe that a lot of people who are in favor of the death penalty
might change their view based on both the amount of litigation
that it is going to generate, and that the death penalty in New
York State is unconstitutional under standards that have already
36
been established.
I am just going to end by discussing what we see as the per se
challenges to the death penalty under the State Constitution. Then
Mary Falk will speak about some of the specific provisions in the
death penalty that seem to be ripe for constitutional challenge.
The first thing we can examine is what has happened in those
states that have had a death penalty for a long time. What has
35. See, e.g., "The Bill of Rights is now largely applicable to state
authorities and is the ultimate guardian of individual rights. The States ....

however, remain the primary guardian of the liberty of the people."
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 739 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. See text accompanying notes 53-55.
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been the result there? Generally, as a matter of state
constitutional litigation, it has been bad in the sense that the states
have basically just adopted the method of the Supreme Court and
have not developed their own individual state jurisprudence.
On the other hand, if we look at other states, we might think
that it is not hopeful to challenge the death penalty since most
states have upheld the imposition of the death penalty. However,
looking at other states it is somewhat antithetical of state
constitutional litigation. There are basically three per se
challenges that have been rejected as a matter of Federal
Constitutional Law, but may appear to have merit to the New
York Court of Appeals. The first is the excessive punishment
37
argument, cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court in Gregg said the question should be
framed to ask whether the death penalty "is so totally without
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction
of suffering." 38 If the answer is "no," then there may be some
penal law justification. Then it is constitutional and there is a
39
presumption of rationality.
Generally, the courts have accepted a kind of total logical
argument. They point to the fact that the death penalty exists and,
therefore, conclude that people must want it to exist. 40 Thus, it
does not offend contemporary notions of decency, and is thus not
unconstitutional. They essentially begged the whole question of
whether the death penalty is actually cruel, is it excessive.
A quote from Clarence Darrow in our second article said the
fact "that capital punishment is horrible and cruel is the reason
37. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. This section provides in relevant part: "[Nior
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted .... " Id.
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 182-83. The Court stated that "we cannot 'invalidate a category
of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the ends
of penology.'" Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 451 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
40. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80. The Gregg Court noted that "[t]he

most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for
murder is the legislative response to Furman." Id. at 179. After Furman, new
death penalty statutes were enacted in at least thirty-five states. Id. at 179-80.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/4

10

Stevenson et al.: Rights And Freedom

1996]
for its existence."

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
41

Of course, if the citizens of New York want

to inflict horrible punishment on murderers, and it seems there is

plenty of evidence of that, maybe they should not get what they
want, and it is the job of the court to keep them from getting
what they want.
It is interesting that the two state courts that have struck down
the death penalty, Massachusetts and California, are also the only
two courts that have gone into much discussion about what it is
like to be executed from the point of view of the person who is
being executed. 4 2 Additionally, the NAACP has written a lot
about what it is like to be executed.

41. Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional
Challenges To New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 161, 189 (1995).
42. See Suffolk Dist. Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass.
1980). Henry Arsenault, a convicted murderer, sentenced to death in
Massachusetts, submitted a pro se amicus curiae brief describing his
experiences on death row. Id. at 1290. Justice Liacos, in his concurring
opinion, reiterated Arsenault's experiences. Id. The opinion stated, in pertinent
part:
For over tvo years, Henry Arsenault "lived on death row feeling as
the
Court's sentence were slowly being carried out." Arsenault could
if
not stop thinking about death. . . . "There was a day to day choking,
tremulous fear that quickly became suffocating." If he slept at all, fear of
death snapped him awake sweating. His throat was clenched so tight he
often could not eat. His belly cramped, and he could not move his
bowels. He urinated uncontrollably. He could not keep still. And all tihe
while a guard watched him, so he would not commit suicide. The guard
was there when he had his nightmares and there when he wet is pants.
Arsenault retained neither privacy nor dignity. Apart from the guards he
was alone much of the time as the day of his execution neared.
And on the day of the execution, after three sleepless weeks and five
days' inability to eat, after a night's pacing the cell, he heard the warden
explain the policy of the Commonwealth-no visitors, no special last meal,
and no medication.... He walked to the death chamber and turned
toward the chair. Stopping him, the warden explained that the execution
would not be for another hour.... When the executioner tested the
chair, the lights dimmed. Arsenault heard the other prisoners scream.
. . . He wet his pants. Less than an hour before the execution, the
Lieutenant Governor commuted his sentence. Arsenault's legs would not
hold him up. Guards carried him back to his cell. He was trembling
uncontrollably. A doctor sedated him. And he was moved off death row.
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We were rather struck -by something that the New Jersey

Supreme Court said in their determination that kidnapping is one
of the aggravating factors in a death penalty case in New Jersey.

The court points out that kidnapping makes a murder typically
depraved and therefore justifies the death penalty. 43 The court
said that "if the victim is aware as a practical certainty that he is
about to be executed, his psychological suffering obviously is

extreme.

In making the victim aware of such imminent

execution, the defendant must have as his purpose for doing so

that this knowledge will cause the victim to endure great

44
psychological suffering. "

We thought that this was a pretty accurate description of what
happens to people on death row. The notion that the death

penalty causes incredible suffering is recognized in one part of
the New Jersey decision, but not as an argument that maybe it is
45
cruel and unusual punishment.
The job for lawyers who oppose the death penalty in New York
will be to try to make the court of appeals look at what the death

penalty is actually like, instead of just saying this is a job for the
legislature. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: The

Id. (Liacos, J., concurring). See also People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.
1972). Subsequently, both Massachusetts and California amended their
constitutions to permit the death penalty.
43. See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 204 (N.J. 1987). In Ramseur,
defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 165-66.
44. Id. at 232 n.39. See also State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949 (N.J. 1994).
In Martini, defendant was convicted of purposeful or knowing murder, felony
murder, kidnapping and two weapons offenses. Id. at 956-57. Defendant was
sentenced to death for the murder. Id. at 957. The court noted that "[bicause
[defendant] took no steps to hide his identity from [the victim], the likelihood
that defendant entertained any thought of freeing his victim is remote indeed,"
Id. at 973. Thus, in performing their proportionality review, the court
compared the kidnapping resulting in murder to, et al., contract killings. Id.
The court found that, "given the terrorizing of [the victim] and his family and
[defendant's] ransom motive, [defendant's] moral blameworthiness, his degree
of victimization, and his character," the death penalty in this case does not
offend principles of proportionality." Id. at 986.
45. The jury that found the "extreme suffering" of the victim was an
aggravating factor. Id. at 975.
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wisdom of the death penalty is not for us to decide. That is
obviously a kind of difficult argument.
The second argument has been less accepted or made less
often, but it seems like a very good one. It is essentially a due
process argument so that the burden of proof is switched and
placed on the state. 46 If we start out with the proposition that life
is fundamental, then before the state can deprive a person of life,
the state must prove the existence of a compelling state interest
and that there is no less drastic alternative. That obviously places
the burden on the state to come up with some very good
reasoning, a very compelling reason, for having the death penalty
47
rather than some other kind of punishment.
In Massachusetts when the state was arguing death penalty
cases, they did not come up with any justification at all,
presumably assuming that that would not be the test, and that the
legislature would be entitled to a presumption of acting
rationally. When a case was put off for the state to come back
with a compelling reason, they were unable to do it. They did not
have, at their command, the statistics that would show a
compelling reason for having a death penalty instead of life
imprisonment without parole.
Under the New York State Constitution, lawyers on both sides,
in this case the district attorneys' office, if they want to meet this
kind of challenge, need to come up with the statistics that will
show there is indeed a compelling reason for imposing death
rather than just imprisonment.
8
The final argument is an equal protection argument. 4
Massachusetts, in striking down its death penalty, relied in part
46. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in relevant part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.

47. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2196 (1994) (noting
that "if [a] State rests its case for imposing the death penalty... on the
premise that the defendant will be dangerous in the future, the fact that the
alternative sentence to death is life without parole will necessarily undercut the
State's argument regarding the threat the defendant poses to society").
48. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or
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on the fact that race considerations enter into capital sentencing

decisions.4 9 Most of the other state courts that have decided this

issue have essentially treated McCleskey as the last word. 50
McCleskey stated that it is permissible to have racial

considerations enter into sentencing. 5 1

It seems to me that it is quite possible that the citizens of the
State of New York would not feel that way if the statistics were
there to show that indeed race discrimination infects the capital
sentencing procedure.

One of the things the Massachusetts court was willing to do
was to rely on the McCleskey statistic. A lot of the other state
courts threw out cases because the defendants were unable to

come forward with local statistics, that show, in Ohio say, that
race infected sentencing determinations.
Thus, in thinking about this under the New York State
Constitution, some thought must be given as to what types of
statistics might be persuasive to the court of appeals. What

statistics can we use without having to wait ten years for two
thousand people to sit around on death row or be executed so we

religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any
other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or
any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.

49. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984). In
Colon-Cruz, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down an
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution which provided that "no
provision of the state constitution may in the future be construed as prohibiting
the imposition of the punishment of death." Id. at 123. The court noted that
adopting the amendment "would mean that a statute establishing the death
penalty for members of one particular race only ...

would be valid under the

Massachusetts Constitution." Id.
50. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 614, So. 2d 455, 463 (Fla. 1992); State v.
Zuern, 512 N.E.2d. 585, 593 (Ohio 1987); Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d
560, 562 (Ga. 1995); State v. Green, 406 S.E.2d 852, 853-54 (N.C. 1991).
51. The McCleskey Court acknowledged that "[tihere is ...some risk of

racial prejudice influencing
Court stated that "because
efforts' to eradicate racial
(citing Batson v. Kentucky,

a jury's decision in a criminal case. However, the
of th[at] risk ...we have engaged in 'unceasing
prejudice from our criminal justice system." Id.
476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)).
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can say at the end of that time, yes, indeed, this has been racially
discriminatory.
At this point, I will let Mary Falk discuss specific provisions of
the New York Constitution. I suppose that what we have
concluded here is that there are a lot of arguments that can be
made under the State Constitution, but at the moment we do not
have the necessary information to make the arguments. It is going
to be the task of the lawyers who are going to be litigating in this
area to come up with local statistical information about how New
Yorkers feel about all of these different areas.
Mary Falk:
In addition to the argument to the per se challenges that are
raisable under the State Constitution, under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 52 the Due Process Clause, 5 3 and the
state's equivalent to the Equal Protection Clause, 54 there are
many specific provisions of our new death penalty statute that are
challengeable under the State Constitution.
For one thing, the statute itself, running to some thirty pages,
provides ample opportunity. Anyone with a basic knowledge of
death penalty jurisprudence can, by a perusal of the statute, spot
easily a dozen arguable challenges.
Statutory issues that have existed in the statutes of other states
and that have been already raised under the Federal Constitution
will be relitigated under the New York State Constitution.
Additionally, issues that may be unique to our statute, and there
52. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. This section provides in relevant part: i[Nlor
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted.. .

."

Id.

53. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in relevant part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
54. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any
other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or
any agency or subdivision of the state.
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may be one or two, although raisable under the Federal
Constitution, will be raised either under both or solely under the
State Constitution in light of the Supreme Court's now ten year
long deregulation of the death penalty, the low floor of
protection.
The many challenges will obviously be grounded in a whole
range of state constitutional provisions, although mainly, for
obvious reasons, to provisions in the state Bill of Rights.
I want to share just a few thoughts about three of the possible
grounds of challenge: not the challenges themselves, but the
grounds of challenge. First of all, challenges under the State
Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, its
Due Process Clause or clauses and the guarantee or perhaps even
guarantees of jury trial.
As with all per se challenges, I think that the instincts of
petitioners, and perhaps the courts as well, will be to think about
the many statutory challenges raisable under a prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. That is so because the great
temptation is to follow the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court where many of these challenges have traditionally
been raised under the Eighth Amendment to the Court.
If we give in to this temptation, my own sense is that it will be
a big mistake. First of all, as an opponent of the death penalty, it
will be a big mistake because I do not think it will be a successful
way to go about making the statutory challenges. Even looking
beyond success or failure, I think that litigating under the New
York State Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which is
virtually identical to the United States Eighth Amendment,
creates a risk that New York State death penalty jurisprudence
would fall into the same abyss of incoherence that federal death
55
penalty jurisprudence has fallen into.
By that I mean the part of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that follows from Furman, Gregg and its progeny. The
55. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII. This provision states in pertinent part:
"[Nior cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. See also N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 5. This section provides in relevant part: "[Nior shall cruel and
unusual punishments be inflicted ....

" Id.
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jurisprudence that tells us that in order to be constitutional, under
the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty must be imposed both
consistently and in an individualized fashion.
In practice, certainly in the federal courts and in the Supreme
Court particularly, this has shown itself as walking the line
between, on the one hand, having it be consistent, and on the
other, having it be individual. This has shown itself to be at a
minimum sort of a Sisyphean task, if not a totally paradoxical
56
and impossible one.
This is so because obviously it attempts to comply with the
requirements of consistency, inevitably runs afoul of the
requirement of individualization, and vice versa. Attempts at
individualization have somehow sloped over into increasing the
juries' discretion and sentencing, and, even certainly to some
commentators, have created the same unbridled discretion that the
requirement of consistency was intended to do away with the
twenty or so years ago.
Therefore, I think that to the extent that New York
practitioners and the court end up buying into this traditional
Eighth Amendment analysis, and using it to talk about our state
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, we
are asking for a lot of trouble. We already have enough trouble,
but we are asking for more.
In State v. Ramseur,57 Justice Handler of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, warned his brethren when they were considering
the New Jersey death penalty statute to abandon the federal
consistency individualization framework. 5 8 I think his prediction
56. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (finding that the
Constitution's requirement of "a heightened degree of fairness to the
individual, and also a greater degree of equality and rationality in the
administration of death, demands sentencer discretion that is at once
generously expanded and severely restricted"); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147,
236 (Conn. 1996) (finding that the "optimal balance between discretion and
direction ... has not and perhaps cannot be reached.").
57. 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
58. Id. at 304 (Handler, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Handler
argued that the court must not follow federal precedent, but should instead
look at their own constitutional resources. Id. He reasoned that schemes for
guided discretion are "[ultimately] ... ineffectual in guiding sentencing
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of years of bitter, and not always entirely comprehensible rancor,
was correct, and he has certainly been proven right in New
Jersey. Certainly, in my observation, the New Jersey Supreme
Court's constitutional discourse has been vastly more and more
civil. Although there has been a tremendous amount of
disagreement among the justices of the New Jersey Supreme
Court on state constitutional issues, I think it has been a more
rational and more fully explained discourse. If that court has
ended up divided and bitter, just imagine what it could be like in
New York.
Unless we can either invent or reclaim some new way of
discussing the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, we
would do better to take Justice Handler's suggestion all those
years ago in New Jersey and adopt a due process analysis instead.
To analyze the constitutionality of procedures for imposition of
the death penalty in terms of due process and fundamental
59
fairness.
Certainly, there is an argument that the New York constitution
shows a sort of a special preoccupation with due process. Not
only do we have in Article One, Section Six, the sort of
traditional analog to the Federal Due Process Clauses, but in the
very beginning of the New York State Constitution, in Article
One, Section One, 60 we have the assurance that there will be no
depravation of rights except by the law of the land. I confess to
complete ignorance of the history and meaning of the clause, but
it certainly sounds to me like due process language.
Another challenge to statutory attacks under the New York
State Constitution will be New York's guarantee of a jury trial.
discretion precisely because the unique severity of the penalty to be inflicted so

escalates the contrary burdens of uniformity and individualization as to render
them extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible to reconcile." Id.

59. Justice Handler argues that the only possible framework for the death
penalty's equitable imposition is for there to be "a state constitutional doctrine
of fundamental fairness grounded in the state guarantee of due process." Mary
R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State ConstitutionalChallenges To
New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 161, 238 n.104 (1995).
60. N.Y CONST. art. I, § 2. This section states in pertinent part: "No

member of this state shall be ...deprived of any rights ... unless by the law
of the land, or the judgment of his peers

." Id.
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The New York Constitution, at least the Bill of Rights, seems to
fairly resonate with insistence on jury trials especially in capital
cases. The right to a jury trial is prominently guaranteed and,
again, seems to be guaranteed twice: in Article One, Section
One, which says that deprivation of rights is to be by judgment of
peers, and again in a more obvious provision in Article One,
Section Two, 6 1 which says that the right to a jury trial shall
remain inviolate forever. Sort of handsome, emphatic language
that is different from the language of the federal Bill of Rights.
In addition, Article One, Section Two provides that where a
crime is punishable by death, there is no possibility of waiver of
the right to a jury trial. Because the right to an unbiased jury trial
is encompassed here, as well as in federal jurisprudence, the
guarantee of jury trial will undoubtedly be the ground of a
challenge to the provision in New York's new death penalty law
that provides for a death qualified jury.
There are many, or at least a certain number of, different
meanings to death qualification, a fairly sinister phrase. When I
first mentioned it to my husband he said "aren't we all death
qualified?" In any event, what the statute means by death
qualification is that potential jurors who pronounce themselves
unable to impose the death penalty can and will be challenged for
cause and will be struck from the jury before the guilt
determination phase. Therefore, people who could not impose the

61. N.Y CONST. art. I, § 2. This section states:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial
may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be
prescribed by law. The legislature may provide, however, by law. that a
verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in nay
civil case. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having
jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws. not
inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time of
presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.
Id.
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death penalty at the separate sentencing phase can not sit at the
guilt determination phase.

This is an issue that has been raised many times in federal and
state courts because there have been many studies done, the
validity of which is acknowledged even by the United States

Supreme Court. Studies that say if you take off all of the people
who could not impose the death penalty and do not let them sit at
a guilt determination, you have a jury that is biased in favor of
conviction because people who could impose the death penalty at
a sentencing phase are biased or unduly biased and conviction

prone.
The obvious argument here is that this violates the guarantee of

an unbiased jury. This issue has been raised many times in the
past fifteen years or so and has had some considerable success in
the lower federal courts. However, when the Supreme Court
came to consider it about ten years ago in a case called Lockhart
v. McCree,6 2 the Court held that "the Constitution does not

prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital
cases." 63
62. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). In McCree, defendant was convicted of felony
murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 166.
During voire dire, the judge, over defendant's objections, removed for cause
those prospective jurors who stated that they could not vote for the death
penalty under any circumstances. Id. Defendant subsequently filed a habeas
corpus petition alleging that the "death qualification" of the jury "violated his
right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to have his guilt or
innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross
section of the community." Id. at 167. He argued that the removal of the
jurors "'slanted' the jury in favor of conviction. Id. at 178.
63. Id. at 173. The Court further held that the Sixth Amendment
requirement that the jury be selected from a fair cross section of the
community applies only to the jury panel selected and not the actual jury
selected: Id. at 174. In 1992, the held that a capital defendant may challenge
for cause "[a] juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every
case .

. . ."

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). See also Michael

W. Peters, ConstitutionalLaw: Does 'Death Qualification' Spell Death for the
Capital Defendant's ConstitutionalRight to an Impartial Jury? [Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)], 26 WASHBURN L.J. 382 (1987).
The New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that a prospective juror
may be challenged for cause when "[tihe crime charged may be punishable by
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In subsequent years, this issue has been raised many times
because this provision seems to be in virtually every state death
penalty law. The issue has been re-raised under the various state
constitutional guarantees of a jury trial. The argument has never
succeeded but, because of its acknowledged grounding in what
appears to be simple fact, it has divided courts tremendously and
certainly has almost succeeded in several instances generating
much dissent. I think this issue will be raised very soon in New
York and it will be interesting to see what the court of appeals
will do with it.
New York's guarantee of a jury trial is also at the center of
what seems to be a very curious constitutional conundrum that
arises out of the guilty plea provision of New York's death
penalty statute. Curiously, it seems that the state constitutional
right to a jury trial is at once the impetus behind this provision,
and at the same time it is the ground of what seems to be an
unanswerable challenge to that very same provision.
The New York statute provides what I call a death avoidance
guilty plea, which is a guilty plea that can be offered by the
defendant with the permission of the agreement of the prosecutor
and the court. A plea of guilty to the capital offense, to capital
murder, may be entered, but when a defendant so pleads the only
possible sentence is life in prison without parole. A defendant in
that situation cannot be exposed to the death penalty.
I do not know the answer to this, but my guess is that this
provision was designed by the legislature to permit a guilty plea.
Surely they wanted to provide for a guilty plea, but the
legislature intended by this provision to provide a guilty plea that
would comply with the state constitutional guarantee of the jury
trial.
This is a very complicated matter, and again this is something
we need a tremendous amount of more research about. Certainly,
the state constitutional guarantee of jury trial can be read in a
death and the prospective juror entertains such conscientious opinions either
against or in favor of such punishment as to preclude such juror from
rendering an impartial verdict or from properly exercising the discretion
conferred upon such juror by lawv. .. " N.Y. CRmI. PROC. Lxw
§ 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney 1995).
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similar provision in the Oregon State Constitution, 64 as read by
Judge Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court. 65 It can be read
to forbid the imposition of death except after a jury trial.
Thus, in order to avoid what is perceived to be a collision with
the State Constitutional guarantee of a jury trial, the legislature
provided for a guilty plea, a plea under which there could be no
imposition of the death penalty without the unanimous agreement
of twelve citizens that this crime had been committed by the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the legislature,
in trying to avoid this collision with the State Constitution,

appears to have run right back into the guarantee of a jury trial
and appears to have, at least according to the United States
Supreme Court, violated the very provision they set out to avoid
colliding with.

In 1968, the United States Supreme Court struck down two
federal death penalty statutes that provided precisely the same

kind of death avoidance guilty pleas that the New York death
penalty statute provides. 66 The Court held that by permitting
64. See Or. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial
by an impartial jury... however ....

any accused person, in other than a

capital case, may elect to waive trial by jury and consent to be tried by the
judge of the court alone. . .

."

Id. (emphasis added).

65. See State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). In Wagner, Judge
Linde argued that article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution requires that
no person be put to death without "the highest degree of certainty by a
unanimous jury that every element of a capital crime has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt .

. . ."

Id. at 1186.

66. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) and Pope v. United
States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). In Jackson, the Court struck down the death
penalty clause of the of the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id. at 591. The Federal
Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate ... commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully ... kidnapped ... and held for ransom ... or

otherwise... shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has
not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
the death penalty is not imposed.
Id. "The statute set forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon a
defendant who waives the right to jury trial or upon one who pleads guilty."
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571.
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guilty pleas that did not expose a defendant to the death penalty,
the statutes unnecessarily burdened the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment 67 right not to incriminate one's self and the Sixth
69
Amendment 68 right to a jury trial.
The Court was concerned with "the defendant ingenuous
enough to seek a jury acquittal ....
[He) stands forewarned that,
if the jury finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he
will die." 70 Thus, it would appear that the right to a jury trial
forbids, or certainly there are very principled arguments with a
lot of precedent, guilty pleas, whether the defendant is exposed to
a possibility of a death sentence or is completely insulated from
any possibility of a death sentence.
That would seem to leave as the only answer a death penalty
statute that forbids any guilty pleas to the indictment. Well,
maybe so, but there seem to be some good arguments that an
accused has a right to plead guilty.
For example, United States v. Jackson,71 a 1968 case in which
the Supreme Court found what I call the term "death avoidance
pleas" to be constitutional. The Supreme Court struck down not
the plea provision but rather the death penalty itself, saying that it
seemed unwilling to allow a statute to stand that did not provide
The Pope Court struck down the death penalty provision of the Federal Bank

Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), because it -'suffer[edi from the same
constitutional infirmity' as that found in the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a)." Pope, 392 U.S. at 651 (citing to United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ." Id.
68. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein

the crime shall have been committed . . . ." Id.
69. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570. The Jackson Court found thait
permitting defendants to avoid the death penalty by pleading gult.\ and
waiving their right to a jury trial resulted in the "inevitable effect" of

"discourag[ing] assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and
to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 581.
70. Id.

71. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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the possibility of a guilty plea. It seems that the constitutionality
of this provision, guilty plea to a capital crime, that exposes a
defendant only to life imprisonment without parole, simply is a
conundrum.
It also seems to be just one example of the kind of vexed
constitutional question that the New York Court of Appeals is
going to face in these next years.
My own feelings and thoughts on the matter are that this kind
of incredibly vexed, if not sort of tortuous and tormented
analysis, is the inevitable result. It is the inevitable result of what
is a constitutional culture, the entirely futile attempt to devise
procedures that take into account what Justice Handler called the
stunning moral fact of the death penalty.
That is all I have to say.
Helen Hershkoff:
Good afternoon. It is a privilege for me to be here. During my
many years of practice, I have always looked forward to the
Albany Law School Conference on the New York State
Constitution. Now that I am teaching, it is a bit sobering to be
the person at the podium, with so many real exptrts on the State
Constitution in the audience, however, I will try to do my best.
Today, I will be speaking about the treatment of the poor and
the treatment of poverty under the New York State Constitution.
It is a topic that raises many important questions about the new
federalism and its independent interpretation.
This morning, much of the discussion flowed from a focus on
constitutional provisions that are similar to, if not identical to,
federal constitutional clauses. I am in somewhat different
territory. There is, of course, no right to welfare in the Federal
Constitution, and its presence in the New York State
Constitution 72 makes us think more clearly about why we ought
72. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This provision states: "The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the

legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
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to have a state constitution. The objective is to question both the
role of the state within our federal system as well as the role of
the government in structuring their affairs so as to insure the
material well-being of the members of the community. While I
do not pretend to have answers to these questions, they do,
provide some interesting background issues for my presentation.
As I have already said, and as you know, the Federal
Constitution has never been read to provide for a right to welfare.
Certainly, the text does not support such a right. It has been said
that having a court declare and enforce such a right would be
illegitimate, raising serious questions about judicial competence.
There are also troubling concerns about federalism. Such as when
a federal court seeks to dictate to a state how it ought to organize
its arrangements and use its money for important social priorities.
There are also concerns about sovereignty. You heard some of
these concerns this morning when Professor Bonventre referred
to the federal floor of rights, which is intended to respect state
sovereignty and provide the states with the necessary space to
determine their own concerns, and to act on their own
interests.All of these policies and factors play out quite
differently when we begin to think about a state constitutional
right to welfare that is enumerated in a state constitution and is
enforced, articulated and implemented by a state court.
The New York State Constitution has been read by the New
York Court of Appeals to provide for an affirmative right to
welfare, 73 thus there is a state duty to protect the poor. 74 Under
the State Constitution, there are three independent provisions that
73. Tucker v. Toia, 89 Misc. 2d 116, 390 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d

728, 730 (1977) (holding that "[fi]n New York State, the provision for
assistance to the needy is not a matter of legislative grace; rather, it is

specifically mandated by our Constitution"). See Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d
453, 460, 373 N.E.2d 247, 250, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351, 355 (1977) (recognizing

that under the New York State Constitution, specifically, Article XVII. "'aid,
care and support of the needy'" is "constitutionally charged" to the State).
74. Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728.

730 (1977). The court of appeals in Tucker found that one of the goals behind
adopting § 1 of Article XVII of the New York State Constitution was to
declare "the existence of a positive duty upon the State to aid the needy." Id.
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deal with poverty. The first is, of course, Article XVII, which
deals generally with aid, care and support to the needy. The
second is Article XVIII, 75 which deals with low income housing
as a public purpose and the third is Article 1,76 which deals with
unemployment benefits. Taken together, these three provisions
provide a very provocative alternative to the negative rights
model of the constitution which has traditionally been associated
77
with the Federal Constitution.
75. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. This provision states:
Subject to the provisions of this article, the legislature may provide in
such manner, by such means and upon such terms and conditions as it
may prescribe for low rent housing and nursing home accommodations
for persons of low income as defined by law, or for the clearance,
replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and
insanitary areas, or for both such purposes, and for recreational and
other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto.
Id.
76. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id. See W.H.H. Chamberlain, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N.Y. 1, 2 N.E.2d
22 (1936). The court of appeals in Chamberlainwas confronted with the issue
of determining the constitutionality of the 1935 Unemployment Insurance
Law. The court stated that the ability of the State to enact such a law
originated "in the exercise of the reserve power of the state to meet [those]
dangers which threaten the entire commonwealth and affect every home." Id.
at 13, 2 N.E.2d at 26. The court further explained that the issue of whether the
state was correct in exercising this power by enacting the new statute was not
an issue to be decided by the courts. Id. In fact, the sole issue for the court to
determine was whether the act itself was so arbitrary or unreasonable that it
would deprive "any employer of his property without due process of law" or
that it would deny him the equal protection under the law. Id. In conclusion,
the court held that the Unemployment Insurance Law does not violate either
Article I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States, nor any other provision of either
Constitution. Id. at 16, 2 N.E.2d at 27. See also N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 500-01
(McKinney 1988) (providing public policy of New York State with regard to
unemployment insurance and provisions of State program).
77. See Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 16-17 (1993). Providing the following analysis of the
negative rights model:
The Federal Constitution has. . . been described as a 'charter of negative
rather than positive liberties.' The courts have used this dichotomy between
negative and positive rights, although subject to intense academic criticism, to
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How we interpret these provisions will raise many important
public policy concerns for the state, and certainly there will be
high stakes consequences for the quality of life in New York. It
is no secret that the nation is now in the midst of a welfare debate
and that most of the proposed legislation would shift
responsibility for the care of the poor and the elimination of
poverty to states and localities. For example, within our own
state, sixteen percent of the population is poor and 1.2 million of
our residents are receiving either Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). If
those federal benefits are cut, it is not clear how the various state
budgets will be affected.
However, in our own state we are aware that the Governor's
recent budget calls for a twenty-five percent cut in welfare
budgets. This would mean that a family of three would be
reduced to subsisting on a welfare grant that is pitched at forty
percent of the poverty level. What the rights of the poor will be
like, if the new regime of welfare reform comes forward, is thus
a very serious question of the new federalism and public policy.
I will focus specifically on Article XVII and look at the
decision-making process of the New York Court of Appeals.
Unlike some of the other speakers this morning, I will offer an
internal discipline approach to the court's reasoning by presenting
a three part typology of how the court decides poverty cases.
Although New York has gone significantly further in affirming
the rights of the poor than it has in affirming rights of
deny a broad variety of claims which have suggested that the federal
government has an affirmative duty .... State Constitutions serve purposes
that are very different from those of the Federal Constitution and deviate
sharply from the 'negative' model. In contrast to the Federal Constitution,
state constitutions unambiguously create affirmative rights to explicit to
governmental services. Put another way, state constitutional language

mandates that states use their plenary authority in specific ways to achieve
explicit and highly self-conscious policy goals.
Id. (citing Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding that "[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that

Government might do little for the people but that it might do too much to
them"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)). See generally David P. Currie,
Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986).
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subsistence, I will assert that it has not gone as far as the 1938
State Constitution would mandate.
I am going to suggest an alternative approach to the analysis of
Article XVII claims which involves a more faithful, historical
reading of the Article. In this approach I part company from
those this morning who said that state tradition means nothing in
our interpretation of state constitutional rights.
Article XVII, § 1 provides that the "aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state
and by such of its subdivisions and in such manner and by such
means as the legislature may from time to time determine." The
New York Court of Appeals has said that this Article is judicially
enforceable. 78 Indeed, the court has said that Article XVII is
fundamental to the relationship between the individual and the
state. 79
My view is that New York Court of Appeals approach to
Article XVII cases falls into three categories. Category one, has
the lowest level of legislative discretion and judicial deference
with the highest level of judicial review. This approach is applied
to cases that involve the denial of relief to poor persons who meet
the State's definition of needy. The seminal case is the 1977 case
of Tucker v. Toia. 80 In Tucker, the state tried to deny cash home
relief benefits, an entirely state funded benefit, to minors who

78. See generally Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400
N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977).
79. Id. at 7, 371 N.E.2d at 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 730. In Tucker, the
court of appeals stated that "[t]he legislative history of the Constitutional

Convention of 1938" concerning the adoption of § 1 of Article XVII is
indicative of the drafter's clear intent that this become "a fundamental part of
the social contract." Id. Moreover, the comments of Edward D. Corsi,
Chairman of the Committee on Social Welfare, stated that one of the purposes
behind adoption of this constitutional provision is "to set down explicitly in
our basic law a much needed definition of the relationship of the people to
their government." Id. at 8, 371 N.E.2d at 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
80. 89 Misc. 2d 116, 390 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 43
N.Y.2d 1,371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977).
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lived separately from their parents but who had not commenced
support protections against the responsible adult. 8 1
In striking down that provision, the court affirmed the
imposition of a positive duty upon the State to the needy under

Article XVII and the violation of that duty by the legislature in
82
simply refusing to aid those whom it has classified as needy.
The legislature has no discretion to depart from the standard

definition of needy which has been articulated. Here, the court
imposes a bright line approach, without balance, by vigorously

enforcing the parameters of legislation that has fact have been
passed.83
81. Id. at 118-21, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 796-99. The New York State Home
Relief program provides access to support for the needy in New York State.
Id. at 118, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 796. The program is the most comprehensive
program of this type in the state and provides both financial and medical
support to the participants. Id. On March 30, 1976, § 158 of New York's
Social Services Law was amended by the enactment of § 15. Id. at 119, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 797 (discussing N.Y. SOC. SERV. L ,w § 158 (McKinney 1992)).
The principal effects of this change were: 1) to deny benefits to minor children
not living with their legally responsible relatives unless they obtained a final
order of disposition in a support proceeding and 2) to place the burden of
obtaining this final order of disposition on these minor children. Tucker. at
119-20, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
82. Id. at 124, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 800. The court stated that it can be
shown, within the record of the Constitutional Convention, that the
responsibility of the State to care for the needy is "recognized to be as
fundamental as any responsibility of government." Id. at 123, 390 N.Y.S.2d
at 800. (citations omitted). Moreover, the Convention record further indicated
that "while the method of performance of these obligations was within the
purview of the legislature, the obligation was to be established and recognized
as mandatory upon the State." Id. at 124, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 800. Therefore.
based on this analysis, the court determined that it "is inescapable that Article
[XVII], [§] 1, of the New York State Constitution establishes a right
fundamental to the relationship between the State of New York and its needy
citizens." Id.
83. Id. at 127, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 802. The court, in rmding that Article
XVII establishes a fundamental right, imposed a burden on the State to prove
the constitutionality of the statute under a strict scrutiny standard of review.
Id. The court shifted the burden of proof to the State to show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the legislation was necessary to satisfy a compelling
state interest and that there was no less restrictive means available to the State
to achieve these interests. Id.
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Category two cases are somewhat more complex. The analysis
is typically applied to those cases that involve claims by poor
people who have been excluded from the State's definition of
needy but who nevertheless seek to enforce a claim to benefits
under an existing state statute. In this situation, legislative
discretion is at an intermediate level, as is judicial review and
judicial deference. The leading case, Jones v. Blum, 84 upheld the
legislative exclusion of the working poor from the definition of
needy. 85 The new definition effectively denied the working poor
the right to receive benefits by denying assistance to those
individuals whose gross income exceeded 150 percent of the state
86
standard of needy.
More recently, in Hope v. Perales,87 the court held that Article
XVII was not violated in the exclusion of the working poor from

84. 101 A.D.2d 330, 476 N.Y.S.2d 214, (3d Dep't 1984), aff'd, 64
N.Y.2d 918, 477 N.E.2d 620, 488 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1985) (stating that a statute
denying an individual the right to receive public assistance based solely on the
determination that his or her gross income exceeded 150% of a state
established standard of need was not violative of Article XVII § 1 of the New
York State Constitution).
85. Id. at 332, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 216. The court determined that the State,
despite the Article XVII mandate to provide "aid, care and support of the
needy" retains the discretion to narrow the classification of those defined as
"needy" and to alter the means of distribution. Id. Therefore, they held that
the statute redefining the definition of needy to those whose gross income was
below 150% of the State standard of need did not violate the duty imposed
under Article XVII. Id. at 333, 476 N.Y.2d at 216. In addition, the court also
reviewed petitioner's claim that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. The court applied the traditional rational basis test and determined
that the clause was not violated because the reclassification of need was
"rationally related to the legitimate goals of conserving Federal funding and
allocating limited welfare funds to the neediest of applicants." Id. at 333-34,
476 N.Y.S.2d at 216-217.
86. Id. at 216, N.Y.S.2d at 333 (discussing the revised definition of
"needy").
87. 83 N.Y.2d 563, 634 N.E.2d 183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994)
(questioning the validity of the New York Prenatal Care Assistance Program
[hereinafter PCAP] under the New York State Constitution because it denies
funding for medically necessary abortions to PCAP eligible women). See
generally N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2520-29 (McKinney 1993).
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the right to receive state subsidized reproductive benefits. 8 8 In
extreme cases, under category two, the court of appeals will
police the boundaries of legislative discretion to make sure that

impermissible non-economic factors have not entered into the
court's decision-making. More typically, however, the court

simply rubber stamps a legislative determination and recites a
mantra that is typical of federal cases dealing with welfare issues.
These are legislative, not judicial functions. 89

Category three cases are the most problematic for the court.
The cases

decided under this approach

typically

involve

challenges to legislative determinations regarding the type,
amount and form of assistance. The governing case here is
clearly Bernstein v. Toia;90 again, a 1977 case which upheld the
88. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 573, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
PCAP was created by the Federal Government to provide reimbursement to
those states providing prenatal care to pregnant women who had household
incomes exceeding the Medicaid eligibility standard. Id. at 572, 634 N.E.2d at
185-86, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13. In New York a pregnant woman is presumed
eligible to receive PCAP "upon a preliminary showing ...that her household
income falls below 185% of the poverty level." Id. at 573, 634 N.E.2d at 185,
611 N.Y.S.2d at 813. Thus, the New York State Legislature, in establishing
the procedural guidelines for the PCAP program, presumed that the
participants would not be in a position to need or require financial assistance
from the State in order to "exercise [their] fundamental right of choice." Id. at
577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816. Therefore, the court stated that
because the statute was not enacted to assist in the support of the needy it does
not violate Article XVII by not providing financial assistance for medically
necessary abortions. Id. at 578, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
89. The court in its analysis of PCAP stated that as an "enactment of a
coequal branch of government, PCAP is entitled to a strong presumption of
constitutionality, and that plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of establishing the
contrary beyond a reasonable doubt." Hope at 574, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 814. The court further stated that the judiciary serve a limited role
in this determination because they are limited in their discretion by whatever
wisdom and motivation surrounded the legislature's enactment. Id. at 575, 634
N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
90. 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 11977). The
court in Bernstein was confronted with the question of whether the State had a
duty, under Article XVII of the State Constitution, to provide individualized
shelter grants to public assistance recipients. Id. at 443, 373 N.E.2d at 241,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Petitioners argued that the State was obligated to
provide grants in an amount sufficient to meet their individual rent expenses
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legislative decision to eliminate individualized rent grants for
welfare recipients.
In the 1987 case of McCain v. Kotch, 9 1 the court held that
Bernstein did not deprive the trial courts of the equitable power
92
to articulate standards in cases involving welfare rights;
however, more recently, the court has in fact gone back to a

rather than in the form of a flat grant, in accordance with a schedule of
maximum allowances. Id. The court of appeals rejected this claim and held
"[wie do not read this declaration and precept as a mandate that public
assistance must be granted on an individual basis in every instance . . . or
indeed as commanding that . . . the State must always meet in full measure all
the legitimate needs of each recipient." Id. at 448-49, 373 N.E.2d at 244, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 348-49.
91. 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1st Dep't 1986), rev'd, 70
N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987). The court in McCain
was confronted with the question of "whether the court has the power to issue
a preliminary injunction requiring the New York City Departments of Social
Services (DSS) and Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD), when
they have undertaken to provide emergency housing for homeless families with
children, to provide housing which satisfies minimum standards of sanitation,
safety and decency." 70 N.Y.2d 109, 113-14, 511 N.E.2d 62, 62-63, 517
N.Y.S.2d 918, 919. There is no question that in a proper case [the] Supreme
Court has [the] power as a court of equity to grant a temporary injunction
which mandates specific conduct by municipal agencies." Id. at 116, 511
N.E.2d at 64, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The defendants in McCain maintained
that the New York "[Slupreme Court in setting and enforcing minimum
standards for emergency housing ... violated the principle that a court
should, as a matter of policy, 'abstain from venturing into areas if it is illequipped to undertake the responsibility and other branches of government are
far more suited to the task."' Id. at 119, 511 N.E.2d at 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d at
922. However, the court held that the actions of the Supreme Court did not
result in an "encroachment on the legislative or executive prerogative" because
there was no existing departmental regulation and therefore it became
"necessary for the court to establish its own minimum standards." Id. at 120,
511 N.E.2d at 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
92. Id. at 119-20, 511 N.E.2d at 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23. The court
in Bernstein was precluded from establishing its own regulatory standards
because to do so would be in direct conflict with the previously established
departmental regulations; whereas, in McCain, the court was able to establish
its own minimum standards since there were no regulations in existence and
therefore no conflict would result. Id. See Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437,
373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977).
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rubber stamping approach. 93 This argument suggests that the
power to define the kinds of programs that are to be provided to

the poor is found not only within the general legislative function,
but also, as indicated by the language of the Article, within the
legislative discretion.
The typology that I have set forth highlights the approach taken
by the court of appeals with respect to its treatment of poverty
under the New York State Constitution. On the one hand, the

court has clearly held that assistance is a positive duty of the state
and that the court will enforce claims under Article XVII. On the

other hand, the legislature has, under Article XVII, broad
discretion to define who are the needy, what the standards of
94
need are and the limitations of state assistance.

The court has provided the legislature with the road map for
circumvention
of the Article
by allowing
legislative
determinations to be recharacterized as the exercise of legislative
discretion and thus becoming immune to judicial review. Article
93. See generally, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d
307, 343-44, 655 N.E.2d 661, 682, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 586 (1995) (stating
that the New York Court of Appeals has avoided making determinations
regarding the qualifications for and amounts provided under various public
assistance programs because these are "choices delegated to the people's
elected representatives, not Judges, and in the absence of their manifest failure
to address the problem, the judiciary should refrain from interfering"):
Goodwin v. Perales, 88 N.Y.2d 383, 396, 669 N.E.2d 234, 240, 646 N.Y.2d
300, 306 (1996) (relying on Bernstein and concluding that it is beyond the
power of the court to alter a departmental regulation unless it is "so lacking in
reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary"); Dams v. Sabol,
165 Misc. 2d 77, 80-81, 627 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529-30 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1995) (stating that although it is not the place of the judiciary to act as
a "superlegislure," it does have the responsibility of enforcing the protection
of those rights which "may have been violated without exercising legislative
powers, for which it lacks constitutional authority").
94. See Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400
N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977) (stating that despite the fact that the State
Constitution allows for legislative "discretion in determining the means by
which this objective is to be effectuated, in determining the amount of aid, and
in classifying recipients and defining the term 'needy,' [sic] it unequivocably
prevents the Legislature from simply refusing to aid those whom it has
classified as needy").
Id. (citations omitted).
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XVII jurisprudence, as it develops, fails to protect the poor
against the primary danger to which the Article was directed;
namely, governmental indifference to the needs of the poor.
Article XVII was adopted in 1938 at the first constitutional
convention of the Twentieth Century, the first constitutional
convention to come closely on the heels of the Great
Depression. 95 Thus, it is against this background of the New
Deal and the rise of totalitarianism that the Article must be
seen. 96 Robert Cover, 97 a great constitutional theorist who taught
at Yale before his death, said "each constitutional generation
organizes itself about paradigmatic events." 9 8 The paradigmatic
events of that era, for the Constitutional Convention Committee
that recommended the adoption of Article XVII, were the New
Deal, the Great Depression, and the rise of totalitarianism.
The 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee understood the
relationship between democratic order and material well-being.
The committee understood there was an evolving role for the
state in assuring material well-being when the market did not
function as it ought to function in protecting lives against
deprivations. Moreover, they recognized that poverty had become

95. Id. at 7, 371 N.E.2d at 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 730. The court in
Tucker explained that
[t]his provision was adopted in 1938, in the aftermath of the great

depression, and was intended to serve two functions: [flirst, it was felt
to be necessary to sustain from constitutional attack the social welfare
programs first created by the State during that period ... ; and, second,

it was intended as an expression of the existence of a positive duty upon
the State to aid the needy.
Id. (citation omitted).

96. 'See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987) (discussing New Deal reformation and shifting
constitutional commitments).
97. Robert M. Cover was a Professor of Law at Yale Law School and
wrote extensively on the subject of constitutional law. See, e.g., Robert M.
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).

98. Id. at 1316.
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a structural and inevitable feature of modem day market
arrangements. 9 9
Article XVII was thus intended to give the government full
authority to enact social welfare programs. It was intended to
foreclose Lockler1 0 0 style objections that violations of due
process resulted from redistribution programs, prohibitions on the
use of public money and even from State credit to aid private
individuals.
The Committee of Social Welfare, which originally drafted the
text that became Article XVII, was very explicit about these
purposes and I will just read to you some language. The
committee said it hoped to "remove from the area of
constitutional duties the responsibility of the state to those who
must look to society for the bare necessities of life," 10 1 but at the
same time the committee wrote "[w]hat [the legislature] may not
do is shirk its responsibilities, which in the opinion of the
committee, is as fundamental as any responsibility of
government." 102

99. See Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8. 371 N.E.2d 449, 451-52. 400
N.Y.S.2d 728, 730-31 (1977). The court of appeals in Tucker detailed the
legislative history behind the enactment of Article XVII./d. Specifically, the
Committee on Social Welfare stated at the 1938 Constitutional Convention:
"[we have made provision for the relief of the needy. Convinced that the care
of the employed and their dependents is in our modem industrial society a
permanent problem of major importance affecting the whole of society ....
Id.
100. Among the various concepts woven into the United States Constitution
by the framers were the writings of John Locke. Locke believed in the concept
of collective rights: that "the concept that rights, in addition to being
individually held, may also be held collectively by the body politic, which
creates and provides the justification for civil government." Donald L.
Doemberg, "We The People." Jolu Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights.
And Standing To Challenge GovernmentalAction, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 55-56.
(1985). See also, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government Second Treatise
(P. Laslett ed. 1960)
101. Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 8, 371 N.E.2d at 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 731

(citing the Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention, vol. 111. p. 2126
(1938)).

102. Id.
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Against this historical background, I will argue, discretion has

a particular meaning. Of course, discretion was surely intended to
insulate social welfare legislation against reversal by the courts.
However, we have to place the term "discretion" in the context

of 1938, in what I will call the plasticity of the moment. It was a
period of bold social experiment where the states were acting as
social laboratories. This discretion was not intended to be a
license for the legislature to ignore the economic needs of the
poor. That structure of analysis, if I may draw on a federal
analogy, is similar to that of Justice Brennan in Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 103 the famous footnote ten about the role of Section 5
104
enforcement under the 14th Amendment.
Justice Brennan in Katzenbach stated that legislative power is
"limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the

14th Amendment, but Section 5 grants no power to restrict,
abrogate or dilute these guarantees." ' 10 5 Likewise, I would
suggest, Article XVII is a one way ratchet for the legislature, The

legislature has a responsibility to take seriously what the 1938
103. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The Court in Katzenbach was asked to
determine the constitutionality of §4e of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
because it was contrary to the New York English literacy requirement. Id. at
643. The Court held that "§ 4e was a proper exercise of the powers under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, New
York's English literacy requirement cannot be enforced to the extent it
conflicts with § 4e." Id. at 646-47. The statute, § 4e, was challenged because
it negated the effects of the previously enacted New York English literacy
requirement, which denied citizens the right to vote unless they possessed the
capacity to read and write English. Id. at 643-44.
104. Id. at 651-52, n.10.
"Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, . . .§ 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact
'statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process
decisions of this Court.' We emphasize that congress' power under § 5
is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants to Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the
States to establish racially segregated systems of education would not be
-- as required by § 5 -- a measure 'to enforce' the Equal Protection
Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws."
Id.
105. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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convention intended when it created a positive right to welfare,
and the court has a responsibility to police the enforcement of
that obligation when discretion would otherwise deprive the poor
of subsistence which they need to survive.
It is not surprising that the New York State Court of Appeals
has been hesitant to review legislative decision-making when it
comes to questions involving the kind and amount of benefits and
assistance provided to the poor. First, the court is acting against
the backdrop of federal law, and second, we know that the
federal courts have taken a hands off approach to social and
economic matters. In Dandrich v. Williams, 106 the court
specifically stated that welfare is outside the domain of the
federal court. 107
In fact, there is a similar hesitancy when any economic issue
comes before the court of appeals because these determinations
are said to be a function of the legislature. 108 This raises very
serious concerns about majoritarianism by implicating both the
legitimacy of the judicial act and the competency of the court to
work.
In looking at these concerns, legitimacy and competency, from
an internal approach, the argument for legitimacy, at least on the
federal side, is that the material world is somehow outside the
106. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
107. Id. at 487. The Supreme Court held that
the intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems

presented by the public welfare assistance programs are not the business
of this court. The constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards
upon systems of welfare administration... [b]ut the Constitution does
not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the
difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among
the myriad of potential recipients.

Id. (citations omitted).
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. See also Bernstein v. Toia,

43 N.Y.2d 437, 446, 373 N.E.2d 238, 243, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347. In
Beristein, the court of appeals could not comment on whether.
"under the constraints of fiscal trimming and in the light of administrative
experience, the legislature's recourse to the flat grant concept was without a
reasonable basis or lacked a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest
of seeking to assure optimum realized benefits from available public assistance
monies." Id.
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domain of constitutional life. That there is a shape and a limit to
what the Constitution ought to reach and economic well-being
simply falls outside that domain.
Here, by contrast in New York, in both the New York State
Constitution and Article XVII, there is explicit text that commits
welfare rights to the constitutional demand that at least goes part
10 9
of the way dealing with issues of legitimacy.
The second concern is that of competency. Somehow the courts
are not institutionally equipped to deal with issues of money or
well-being. They do not have the internal institutional structure to
deal with analyzing and processing either complex data or
competing policy considerations.
My own view is that it is way too late in the day to argue about
the competency of the court in dealing with complex social and
material matters. It is not only that the courts, both federal and
state, have for many decades failed to deal with highly complex
policy issues. In fact, they have dealt with complex issues
involving, school finance, desegregation, bankruptcy, and tax
law, each raising fundamental issues about the raising and
spending of public money. When we look at a state court, it is
also inconsistent with the common law tradition. It is inconsistent
with the generative capacity that state courts have always had
when they resolve complex issues of public matters.
It is here that state courts are especially equipped to construct
norms and to articulate a social vision for the state. In such
circumstances the court can, insist that the legislature take its
Article responsibilities seriously. It can compel the legislature to
articulate a basis for its decision-making. It can require a strong
justification. It can police the decision-making process through
something similar to the "hard look doctrine" that has been used
by federal courts to review administrative agency decisionmaking. 110
109. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This provision states: "[tihe aid,
care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means,
as the legislature may from time to time determine." Id.

110. See Matthew J.McGrath, Covergence of the Substantial Evidence and
Arbitrary and CapriciousStandards of Review During Informal Rule Making,
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On the common law side, the approach that I am suggesting is
not dissimilar from the approach that the court would use to find
a breach of corporate duty to shareholders. There we look to see
whether a process of decision-making has been complied with.
We look to see whether various factors have been considered,
that process-oriented approach that leads us to the major
substance of the decision. The court will ask in the corporate
context: Is the decision ultimately fair to the shareholders?
On the Federal Constitutional side, one version of this test was

articulated by the Supreme Court in the Youngberg v. Romeo111
decision. There it says that constitutional decisions that involve a
large expenditure of money in an institutional context must fall
112
within the range of professional decision-making.
In closing, our instinct in the last twenty years, and in the last
post Warren period, has viewed judicial activism as antidemocratic, as imperial, and even inefficient. Most of our
thinking about judicial activism, however, comes from an
analysis of federal courts interpreting Federal Constitutional
provisions, rather than from the decision-making of state courts

looking to state constitutional provisions that are unique to
particular states.
State courts are very differently situated from the federal courts

in a number of institutional respects on which we have already
commented. The common law background clearly is preeminent.
In some instances state court judges are elected by the people,
therefore, they are considered, in a sense, politically accountable.
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541 (1986). This author defines the -hard look
doctrine" as "operat[ing] to make the arbitrary and capricious standard stricter
[by] bringing it closer to the substantial evidence test." Id. at 550. Moreover.
under the operation of this doctrine, "the reviewing court must take a 'hard
look' at the agency decision if it believes that the agency 'has not genuinel.
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.'" Id. (citing Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
111. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
112. Id. at 320-21. The Court in Youngberg stated that there must
ultimately be a healthy balance between the liberty interests held by an
individual and the organizational requirements of a complex social system. Id.
Moreover, in an institutional setting professional judgment must be adequately
exercised in order to comply with constitutional mandates. Id.
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Much has also been spoken about the new and different
relationship between the judiciary and the legislature within the
state court system. Certainly the literature on the school finance
cases speaks about the dialogue that comes into play when a state
court articulates and enforces a positive right. 113 My own view is
that the defining characteristic of the common law was to restrain
the legislature, not only when the legislature goes beyond the
bounds of discretion, but also when it fails to meet the obligation
that discretion provides.
The New York Court of Appeals has an obligation to insure
that the legislature takes seriously its Article XVII obligation.
Justice Cardozo, summarized this view when he eloquently
stated; "the chief worth of courts is making vocal and audible the
ideals that might otherwise be silenced, in giving the continuity
of life and expression, in guiding and directing choice within the
114
limits where choice ranges."
Thank you.
Robert A. Heverly:
It is my pleasure to be here and included in this panel. When
we began setting up the program for this year a number of people
asked if I would like to be involved in it formally, although I had
not been in the past. I am going to be speaking about the right to
freedom of expression under the New York State Constitution, 115
113. See Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3
L. 7, 18-19 (1993).

WIDENERJ. PUB.

"In the last six years, state courts around the country have issued a
number of decisions that have recognized the right to adequate education

and have ordered significant changes and improvements in each of their
state's public school systems. The elaboration of these rights has

evolved out of a unique interaction between the state judiciary, on the
one hand, and the state legislature and executive branches on the other.

At least one state judge described this kind of interaction as one to
which the '[f]ederal courts are ...strangers.'"

Id. (citation omitted).
114. Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-94
(1921).
115. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section eight provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
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with a substantive analysis from 1991 to 1995. Do not let the
"substantive" title fool you. We are also going to have to talk
about process. However, the analysis will not be as in depth as
that of the panel this morning, or the panel this afternoon. We
are going to look at some case law decided prior to 1991, as well
as some historical developments.
We should probably start with a reading of the constitutional
provisions in issue. Article I, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution reads in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed
116
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
Whereas the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, states:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ...."117 There definitely a different feel
to the latter. I think that the relevance of the distinction between
the two is, in a large part, why we are here today.
Freedom of Expression issues have been raised throughout the
history of New York State, but the more modem types of
jurisprudence started with a 1980 case, Bellanca v. New York
State Liquor Authority. 118 Now, there are some recurring themes
to watch for in the First Amendment, article I, section 8 cases in
New York State case law and they begin with Bellanca.
First, this is the second time that the New York Court of
Appeals has heard the Bellanca case. 119 The case was originally
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
116. Id.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... ." Id.
118. 51 N.Y.2d 879, 414 N.E.2d 404, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1980). rev'd.
452 U.S. 714 (1981), on renimnd to 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765, 445
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982).

119. The Erie County Supreme Court granted plaintiff's summary judgment
motion, declaring a New York statute, prohibiting topless dancing in all

premises licensed by the New York State Liquor Authority, unconstitutional.
Id., 50 N.Y.2d 524, 407 N.E.2d 460, 429 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. Erie

County 1980). The State appealed and the New York Court of Appeals
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heard by the New York Court of Appeals and was then appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then
remanded the case back to the court of appeals where they heard
and decided the case for the second time. When a situation such
as this happens, and it has happened more than once, there is
always an earlier court of appeals decision, where the court found
a certain way under the Federal Constitution but was reversed.
Essentially what has happened is that the court of appeals reached
a decision, they reasoned it out under the Federal Constitution,
and the case was then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court who says "you were wrong." The Court then remands the
case back to the state court to deal with it.
Second, and I have not exactly figured out how this fits in, is
that the New York Court of Appeals tends to be involved in a lot
of cases involving risqu6 types of speech and expression, lewd
and lascivious behavior, adult videos and topless dancing. These
issues seem to recur in those cases where the court is expounding
affirmed the lower court, holding that the statute was "unconstitutional tnder
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id., 54 N.Y.2d at
231, 429 N.E.2d at 766, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 88. Certiorari was granted. Id. at
230, 429 N.E.2d at 766, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 88. The Court, in deciding the case,
stated that even if they were to find the statute "unconstitutional under the
First Amendment its enactment by the State would be authorized under the
provisions of the Twenty-first Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at
233, 429 N.E.2d at 767, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 89. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute by recognizing that the Twenty-first Amendment
grants broad powers to the state "to regulate the times, places and
circumstances under which liquor may be sold... [and] pursuant to [this]
power [the state may ban topless dancing in] establishments granted a license
to serve liquor." Id. at 233, 429 N.E.2d at 767, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 89. The
Supreme Court then remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals "to
consider the validity of the [statute] under the provisions of [the New York]
State Constitution, an issue which [was] not address[ed] when the case was
before [the court] on the prior occasion and which, of course, was not within
the scope of the Supreme Court's review." Id. at 234, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 90. The court of appeals held that "the guarantee of freedom of
expression set forth in our State Constitution is of no lesser vitality than that
set forth in the Federal Constitution" and that the State Constitution does not
contain a provision similar to the Twenty-first Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, therefore, the statute remains unconstitutional under the New
York State Constitution. Id. at 235, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
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on the right to freedom of expression under the state constitution.
In Bellanca, the facts involved a challenge to a state prohibition
against topless dancing in establishments that serve liquor. 120
The New York Court of Appeals validated the statute in
Bellanca based on an analysis of the Federal Constitution. 12 1 The
United States Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded
the case to the court of appeals because of the United States
Constitution's Twenty-First Amendment which gives the States
the right to control liquor. 12 2 The Court found no significant
conflict between the Twenty-first and the First Amendments in
this case. 123 The case was then remanded to the New York Court
of Appeals. As is typical, the court reaffirmed their previous
decision, but with different reasoning. 124 Rather than blessing the
New York State Constitution, the court stated that "we do not
have a similar amendment to the Twenty-first as it regards the
state controller for liquor, we only have article I, section 8."
Absent the balancing function of the Twenty-first Amendment,
the First Amendment or article I, section 8 will control. The
court expressly refused to decide whether the State Constitution
provided any more protection. 125
In Beach v. Shanley, 12 6 a reporter wrongfully obtained a sealed
report detailing a grand jury investigation of alleged violations
within the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Office which outraged the
District Attorney (DA) because the sealed reports were not to be

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Bellanca, 54 N.Y.2d at 230, 429 N.E.2d at 766, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
Id. at 233-34, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
See Id. at 233-34, 429 N.E.2d at 767-68, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90.
Id.
Id. at 234, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
Bellanca, 54 N.Y.2d at 234-35, 429 N.E.2d at 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d at

90.
126. 94 A.D.2d 542, 466 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1983), rer'd 62 N.Y.2d
241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984) (finding that the quashing of
a subpoena, which would have compelled a television reporter to testify before
a grand jury regarding his unauthorized receipt of a report of another grand
jury, was constitutional despite the criminal nature of the reporter's act
because the identity of the reporter's confidential source was privileged
pursuant to the New York Shield Law).
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given to reporters. 12 7 The DA subpoenaed the reporter to find
out who provided him with the reports. 128 Subsequent to this, the
DA recused himself for fear that someone from his own office
"was responsible for disclosing the sealed report's contents." ' 12 9

Consequently, a special prosecutor was appointed to the matter
and the reporter sought to quash the subpoena by asserting
protections afforded under the New York Shield Law, 130 a
13 1
statutory privilege defense.

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate
division, which had found that the statutory Shield Law
1 32
conflicted with article I, section 6 of the State Constitution
127. Id. at 246, 465 N.E.2d at 306, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (b) (McKinney 1992). Section 79-h (b)
provides:
[N]o professional journalist or newscaster presently or having previously been
employed or otherwise associated with any newspaper, magazine, news
agency, press association, wire service, radio or television transmission station
or network or other professional medium of communicating news or
information to the public shall be adjudged in contempt by any court in
connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, or by the legislature or other
body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist
or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature or other body having
contempt powers for refusing or failing to disclose any news obtained or
received in confidence or the identity of the source of any such news coming
into such person's possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news for
publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast by a
radio or television transmission station or network or for public dissemination
by any other professional medium or agency which has one of its main
functions the dissemination of news to the public, by which such person is
professionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity
notwithstanding that the material or identity of a source of such material or
related material gathered by a person described above performing a function
described above is or is not highly relevant to a particular inquiry of
government and notwithstanding that the information was not solicited by the
journalist or newscaster prior to disclosure to such person.
Id. at § 79 h (b).
131. Beach, 62 N.Y.2d at 246-47, 465 N.E.2d at 306-307, 476 N.Y.S.2d
at 767-68.
132. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, § 6 states: "[t]he power of grand
juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to
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because it impaired the powers granted to the grand jury. 133 The
appellate division, in reinstating the subpoena, agreed with
respondent's reasoning that "section 79-h [wa]s invalid because it
r[an] afoul of the constitutional proscription against laws that
suspend or impair a grand jury's power to inquire into willful
misconduct by a public officer." 134 However, the court of

appeals

found

respondent's

argument

unpersuasive,

and

therefore, reversed the appellate division's argument. 135
The most interesting aspect of the Beach case, for purposes of

our discussion, centers on Judge Wachtler's concurring opinion
in which he recognized a free speech guarantee under article I,
section 8 of the State Constitution. 136 Judge Wachtler expressed
displeasure with the idea that section 79-h interfered with a
constitutional grant of power to a Grand Jury. Therefore, he
expressed the need to recognize the free expression right in this
context. 137 New York State has always had a tradition of
protecting the freedom of the press. For example, the John Peter
Zenger trial in 1735,138 which resulted in Mr. Zenger's acquittal,
is consistent with this practice of providing broad protections to

find indictments or to direct the filing of information in connection with such
inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law." Id.
133. Beach, 62 N.Y.2d at 247, 465 N.E.2d at 307, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
134. Id. at 252, 465 N.E.2d at 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
135. Id. (holding that the purpose of Article I, Section 6 of the New York
Constitution was to protect from legislative interference the powers of the
grand jury, not to prevent the creation of evidentiary privileges by the
Legislature). Id.
136. Id. at 255, 465 N.E.2d at 311, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 772 (Wachtler. J..
concurring) (positing that the expansive free press guarantees embodied in the
State Constitution under Article 1, Section 8 should be recognized as providing
a reporter or newspaper protection from being held in contempt for refusing to
disclose their confidential news sources to official investigators). Id.
137. Id. at 256, 465 N.E.2d at 312, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (Wachtler. J..
concurring).
138. Id. at 255, 465 N.E.2d at 312, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (Wachtler, J.,
concurring) (discussing the trial of Mr. Zenger who "was prosecuted for
publishing articles critical of the New York colonial Governor after he refused
to disclose his source," but was later acquitted). Id. See 23 Ency. Brit. 1956 p.
944 (describing the John Peter Zenger trial of 1735).
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the press in the actions of the City and the State and actions
13 9
governed by the Constitution.
In 1986, Judge Wachtler wrote the decision in Arcara v. Cloud
Books. 140 Again, procedural posturing. To the court of appeals,
the United States Supreme Court said, in effect, "you were
wrong, send it back down."
The New York Court of Appeals in this case was again

examining risqud issues. In Arcara, an investigator from the
District Attorney's Office entered a combination adult bookstore
and theater. 141 While in the store, he witnessed various lewd and

lascivious acts going on. He saw people engaged in actual sexual
activities in the bookstore, in the movie booths, and in the
aisles.142 The District Attorney, instead of arresting or
prosecuting the offenders, chose to close the bookstore pursuant

139. Id. at 255-56, 465 N.E.2d at 312, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (Wachtler, J.,
concurring) (discussing New York's long history of providing broad protection
to publishers and other news sources). Id.
140. 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986). This was
an action by the Erie County District Attorney seeking to close a bookstore "as
a public nuisance" because the premises were being used for illegal sexual
conduct. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 555, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals was
asked to determine "whether an order closing the bookstore, to curtail the
illegal acts of customers, incidentally affects the store's constitutional right to
freedom of expression, so as to require the State to show that it is the only
available means to abate the nuisance." Id. The court of appeals originally held
that "such an order would have an incidental impact on the bookseller's First
Amendment rights and that the prosecutor had not demonstrated that closing
the defendant's store was the least restrictive means to abate the nuisance
created by some of its customers." Id. (citations omitted). Alternatively, the
Supreme Court reversed this decision stating "that the bookseller's First
Amendment rights would not be implicated or sufficiently affected by an order
aimed at curtailing the illegal conduct of some of the store's patrons. Id.
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court remanded the case for the court of
appeals to determine whether the bookseller would receive greater protection
under the New York State Constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression,
Article I, section 8. Id. at 555-56, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
141. Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
142. Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 493-94, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46.
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to Public Health Law, article 23, title 11.143 The statute would
allow them to close an operation such as this, as a nuisance, for
one year. 144 The store owner said: "We are a bookstore. We
have books that are protected under freedom of expression in our
store, shutting us down is going too far, you are doing more than
you need to do."

14 5

Well, as you might guess from Wachtler's opinion, the court
found for the book store. 146 The court determined that the

District Attorney had gone too far in that closing the store for a
year was too harsh. The fact that the owners could move the
same business to another store did not matter to the court.
Instead, they were more concerned with the fact that they were
143. Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846. See generally
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2320-34 (McKinney 1993) (discussing houses of
prostitution, injunctions and abatements).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 556-57, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
146. In his opinion Judge Wachtler stated that "the minimal national
standard established by the Supreme Court for First Amendment rights cannot
be considered dispositive in determining the scope of this State's constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression." Id. at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494-95, 510
N.Y.S.2d at 846-47. In his opinion, Judge Wachtler concurs with the court's
earlier reasoning in Bellanca, which stated that the "the guarantee of freedom
of expression set forth in our State Constitution is of no lesser vitality that that
set forth in the Federal Constitution." Id. at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495. 510
N.Y.S.2d at 847 (citing Bellanca v. State Liquor Authority, 54 N.Y.2d 228,
429 N.E.2d 765, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1981)). In deciding the state constitutional
issue the court determined that closing the store was not done for the purpose
of restraining free expression by prohibiting the selling of books. Id. The
reason for the closing was to prevent the patrons from committing illegal acts,
therefore the action will be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than if it had
been a restraint of speech. Id. In order for the court to determine whether the
State action infringes on the store owners freedom of expression the test -is the
impact of the action on the protected activity and not the nature of the activity
which prompted the government to act." Id. When a government regulation
"would incidentally burden free expression, the government's action cannot be
sustained unless the State can prove that it is no broader" than necessary. Id.
Here, the court determined that the reason for closing the store was to prevent
illegal sexual acts and the impact on the legitimate business of selling books
was incidental. Id. Therefore, State had the burden of proving that they have
"chosen a course no broader than necessary to accomplish its purpose." Id. at
559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
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going to shut down the store at that site which was too much for
them. The court in that case wanted a close fit between the state's
objectives and how it accomplished them.
In 1991, the New York Court of Appeals wrote a Federal
Constitutional decision when it decided Immuno Ag v. Moor
Jankowski. 147 I disagree with with the statement made this
morning, that the court in Immuno decided the case on both state
and federal grounds. 148 The original court decision breifly
referred to the state court decisions, however, all of the analysis
in the case cited to federal court decisions. 149 Although the court
147. 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989), rel'g
denied, 75 N.Y.2d 866, 552 N.E.2d 179, 552 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1990), cert.
granted, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990), remanded, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). Immuno
involved a libel action against an editor of a scientific journal because of his
publication of a letter to the editor that involved a public controversy.
Inmuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 239, 567 N.E.2d at 1271, 566 N.Y.2d at 907. The
New York Court of Appeals in its original decision held that there was no
triable issue of fact because the opinions contained in the letter "were entitled
to the absolute protection of the State and Federal constitutional free speech
guarantees, and that charges of defendant's deliberate incitement to have a
defamatory letter published lacked factual foundation." Id. The courts
determination that there was no triable issue of fact was based solely on a
Federal Constitutional analysis. Inmuno, 74 N.Y.2d at 555-61, 549 N.E.2d at
132-35, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 941-44 (discussing various federal court decisions in
constructing the appropriate standard of review). The United States Supreme
Court subsequently granted plaintiffs petition for appeal and reversed and
remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals to be reevaluated in light
of their recent decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990). Inununo, 77 N.Y.2d at 239-40, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
908. The New York Court of Appeals, reviewing the case on remand, affirmed
their prior holding. Id. at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
However, the court, in their reevaluation, not only decided the case on federal
grounds but also premised this second "decision on independent State
constitutional grounds as well as the Federal review directed by the Supreme
Court." Id.
148. See Immuno, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 549 N.E.2d 129
(1989). The court, in its examination of the letter to the editor, whether fact or
opinion, conducted this review in accordance with established federal law. See
id. 74 N.Y.2d at 555-61, 549 N.E.2d at 132-35, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 941-44.
149. Id. 74 N.Y.2d at 555-61, 549 N.E.2d at 132-35, 549 N.Y.S.2d at
941-44. The court in determining whether a triable issue of fact existed cited
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discussed some state and common law issues the State
Constitution was not addressed in the court's decision. 150
Instead, the court merely stated and raised certain state issues

without settling the state claims. The case was subsequently
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where it was
15 1
reversed and remanded.

On remand, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its
prior position. 152 The facts here involve that of opinion and the
dichotomy analysis of the court. The court of appeals found that
the prior case law in this area had clearly established that if a
statement was an opinion then it would be protected under the
guaranteed right to free speech contained in the Federal
Constitution. 153 In other words, you can state your opinion about
the character of a person without worrying about repercussions,
because such an opinion constitutes protected speech.
In Immuno, the protected speech involved concerned a letter to
an editor of a specific journal which alleged that a research
company was moving to South Africa to bypass restrictions on
the use of chimpanzees in research. 154 The allegation, however,

case law from numerous federal court decisions, thereby indicating both its
preference for a Federal Constitutional analysis and lack of a State
Constitutional analysis.
150. Id.
151. 497 U.S. 1026 (1990).
152. Irnuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
918.

153. imnuno, 74 N.Y.2d at 555, 549 N.E.2d at 132, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 941
(stating that "it is settled that pure opinion - however misguided or
vituperative - is entitled to the absolute protection of the State and Federal
constitutional free speech guarantees.").
154. The publication of a letter to the editor in a specialized scientific
journal was the cause of this libel action. Innumno, 77 N.Y.2d at 240, 567
N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The defendant Dr. J. Moor-Jankowski.
was a professor at New York University who both cofounded and edited the
journal. Id. The letter was submitted by Dr. S. McGreal, Chairwoman of a
primate advocacy group, the International Primate Protection League (IPPL).
Id. The focus of the letter was to expose a plan by Immuno AG, a large
multinational corporation, to establish a hepatitis research facility in West
Africa. Id. The letter criticized this plan for a number of reasons:
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could not be proven to be false and therefore., constituted
protected opinion which was non-actionable defamation. 155
The case was remanded by the United States Supreme Court for
consideration in light the Court's decision in Milkovich v. Lorain
"(1) that the motivation for the plan was presumably to avoid
international policies or legal restrictions on the importation of
chimpanzees, an endangered species; (2) that it could decimate the wild
chimpanzee population, as capture of chimpanzees generally involved
killing their mothers, and it was questionable whether experimental
animals could be returned to the wild, as plaintiff proposed; and (3) that
returning the animals to the wild could well spread hepatitis to the rest
of the chimpanzee population."
Id.
The publication of the letter was accompanied by an introductory note
explaining its origin. Id. The note identified the author as an member of IPPL,
that Immuno Ag. had been sent a copy of the letter for comment or reply, that
plaintiff, Immuno Ag. had received the letter and had declined to make any
response other than that the matter had been referred to their attorneys. Id. at
240-41, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The note further stated
that the attorneys representing Immuno Ag. responded by alleging that the
statements within the letter were "inaccurate, unfair and reckless, and
requested the documents upon which the accusations were based." Id. at 241,
567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The attorneys also threatened legal
action if the plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to reply before
the letter was printed. Id. The plaintiff was given two additional months to
draft a response and, after receiving no additional contact from the plaintiff or
its lawyers, the letter was finally published approximately one year after it had
been received. Id. Plaintiff filed this cause of action "against Moor-Jankowski
and seven other defendants, including McGreal and the publishers and
distributors of the Journal." Id. at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
909. The case was vigorously litigated and "all the defendants except for
Moor-Jankowski have settled for what the motion court described as
'substantial sums.'" Id. at 242, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
The original court of appeals decision was in accord with the findings of the
appellate division, which found that because the plaintiff failed to produce
evidence of a falsity the letter "was a constitutionally protected expression of
opinion that could not, as a matter of law, support an action for defamation."
Id. The court of appeals, reveiwing the case on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, affirmed this decision "adopting without further elaboration
our prior conclusion as to the lack of factual foundation for the deliberate
incitement charges, and concentrating our analysis on the substance of the
challenged statements." Id.
155. Id. at 242, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
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Journal Co.. 1 5 6 Milkovich changed the way the Court analyzed
statements of opinion and fact. The Court in Milkovich eliminated
the opinion and fact dichotomy by looking for assertable facts.
Under the Supreme Court's guidance, the court of appeals on

remand, was instructed to hear the Iiwnuno case again and reach
a decision under the Federal Constitution. However, on remand,
the Court of Appeals determined that under the new law laid
down in Milkovich its prior decision was still correct. 157
156. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The court of appeals, applying the Supreme Court
holding in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Co. stated: "Milkovidc leaves in place
all previously existing Federal constitutional protections, including the
'breathing space' which 'freedoms of expression require in order to survive,'
and specifically including immunity for statements of opinion relating to
matters of public concern that do not contain a provably false factual
connotation. Milkovich puts an end to the perception... that, in addition to
all other Federal constitutional protections, there is a 'wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion'." Inununo, 77 N.Y.2d
at 242, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (citing the Supreme Court
decision in Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
157. Inununo, 77 N.Y.2d at 244-48, 567 N.E.2d at 1274-77, 566 N.Y.S.2d
at 910-13. In Milkovich the Supreme Court appears to have struck a balance
"between First Amendment protecton for media defendants and protection for
individual reputation: except for special situations of loose, figurative,
hyperbolic language, statements that contain or imply assertions of provably
false fact will likely be actionable." Id. at 245, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 911. The letter in question states, as a core premise, the
following: "Release of chimpanzee veterans of hepatitis non-A, non-B research
would be hazardous to wild populations, as there is not way to determine that
an animal is definitely not a carrier of the disease." Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at
1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911. In applying the standards of Milkovich, the core
premise analysis, to the contents of the letter, the court of appeals was able to
ascertain two statements of fact, "one express and one implied." Id. The first
statement alleged that there was, at the time, no scientific method to determine
whether an exposed chimpanzee was a carrier of the disease and the second
statement alleged that the plaintiff planned to release chimpanzees which were
possible carriers into the wild population. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 912. Although the court determined that the "core premise could
be actionable" because the statements contained verifiable claims, were of a
type of speech which was restrained, were seriously maintained, and had an
apparent basis in fact the complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff was
unable to meet their burden of proving the falsity of the statements. Id. Thus.
as in the prior court of appeals decision, the same failure on the part of the
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In hearing the case on remand, the court of appeal's also
addressed New York State Constitutional issues 158 by stating,
"this State, a cultural center for the nation, has long provided a
hospitable climate for the free exchange of ideas." 159 Remember,
there was no citation by Judge Wachtler for those types of
remarks other than to John Peter Zenger and the concentration

publications. 160He stated "[t]hat tradition is embodied in the free
speech guarantee of the New York State Constitution, beginning
with the ringing declaration that '[e]very citizen may freely
16
speak, write and publish. . . sentiments on all subjects.'" 1
The court of appeals in the second Immuno decision, was
confusing by failing to specify whether its decision was based on
interpretive or non-interpretive factors or whether it used
historical analysis to reach its conclusion. 162 This confusion was
further compounded by the court considering additional State

Constitutional issues on remand where such issues were not
raised on the initial appeal.

163

This presented an interesting

plaintiff to meet its burden of proof justified the courts granting of the
summary judgment. Id.
158. Id. at 1277-82 (containing the full analysis appliLd by the court of
appeals).
159. Id. at 1277 See also Beach v. Shaney, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 255-56, 465
N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
160. See generally Beach, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d
765.
161. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
913; See also N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 8.
162. hnnuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
914. The court stated: "Thus, whether by the application of 'interpretive'
(e.g., text, history) or 'noninterpretive' (e.g., tradition, policy) factors, the
'protection afforded by the guarantees of free press and speech in the New
York Constitution is often broader than the minimum required by' the Federal
Constitution." Id. (citations omitted). The court further provided: "[W]e
decide this case on the basis of State law independently, and that in our State
Law analysis reference to Federal cases is for the purpose of guidance only,
not because it compels the result we reach. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1277,
566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
163. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
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process for the court in deciding these issues on a summary
judgment motion. 164
Procedurally, the court of appeals, in deciding the summary
judgment on remand, went through and searched the previous
record which led to the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 165
There were many more State Constitutional issues raised on
remand than on the initial appeal. 166 However, three concurring
opinions said, in effect, that the analysis of State law was
ridiculous and that there was no need for the court to go that
far. 167
Also in 1991, the New York Court of Appeals decided
Children of Bedford v. Petromelis.168 In this case there was a
164. Id. The case was presented to the court of appeals as a summary
judgment motion, "which searches the record and presents only issues of law."
Id. The court in this search found that there were "no factual issues to be
resolved" under State law and granted the request for summary judgment. Id.
However, the court did not stop there. Instead they cited to the United States
Supreme Court in Milkovidh, n. 5, where the Court indicated that "the Ohio
court remains free, on remand some fifteen years after the challenged article,
to address State law issues." Id. at 251, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
914 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11 n.5 (1989)). The
court of appeals found this situation to be equally true of the lbninno case and
proceeded to conduct an independent State law review of the constitutional
claims. Id. at 251, 567 N.E.2d at 1278-79, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15. In
deciding the case on independent state grounds, the court in effect, was able to
preclude further review of the case by the Supreme Court. Id. at 257, 567
N.E.2d at 1283, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Simons, J., concurring).
165. The court held that "defendant's summary judgment motion was
properly granted and the complaint dismissed, premising our decision on
independent State constitutional grounds as well as the Federal review directed
by the Supreme Court." Inznuro, 77 N.Y.2d at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 908.
166. Id. at 249-55, 567 N.E.2d at 1278-82, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914-18.
167. Id. n.6 at 1282 (providing a detailed analysis of the various opinions

issued by the members of the court).
168. 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991), cert.
granted, 502 U.S. 1025 (1992), rev'd, 79 N.Y.2d 972, 592 N.E.2d 796, 583
N.Y.S.2d 188 (1992) (declaring, on remand from the United States Supreme
Court, that "Executive Law § 632-a [is] unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.. . "). Id., 79 N.Y.2d at 975, 592 N.E.2d at 796, 583 N.Y.S.2d

at 188. Executive Law § 632-a "was enacted in response to public outrage over
the 1977 Son of Sam murders and news reports that the killer was being
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state statute, Executive Law section 632-a, 169 which stated that if

you profit from your crimes, you must place that money in
escrow where a victim can make a claim against it. If the victim
does not make a claim against it, the money will, after a certain
number of years, revert back to the accused or convicted person.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the statute as
applied did not violate either the right to due process or the right
to freedom of speech. 170 The court concluded that the statute,

although, content based, imposed a direct burden on the right to
freedom of speech. Therefore, the state had to show that the
statute was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest
and the court determined that they did. 171
offered substantial sums of money for the exclusive rights to his story." Id.,
77 N.Y.2d 713, 720-21, 573 N.E.2d 541, 544, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456. The
bill established various procedures to "ensure that criminals would not profit
from their crimes before the victims of those crimes had an opportunity to
obtain compensation." Id. The issue in Children of Bedford v. Petromelis
involved the publication of a book and the assignment of the book royalties by
Jean Harris after her conviction and imprisionment for the killing of Dr.
Herman Tarnower. Id. at 718, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
Harris had written a book which detailed her version of the crime "as well as
expressions of her thoughts, feelings, opinions [and] emotions regarding the
crime." Id. (citations omitted). See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney
1996).
169. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1996).
170. Children of Petromelis, 77 N.Y.2d at 718, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 455. The court determined that "[t]he statute is content-based and
imposes a direct burdern on speech: it singles out a category of speech based
on subject matter and imposes special burdens on that category. Thus, the
statute must be strictly scrutinized and unless it serves a compelling
governmental purpose and is narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose, it is
invalid." Id.
171. The court in determining that the statute satisfied a compelling state
interest stated: "[tihe statute is the codification of the fundamental equitable
principle that criminals should not be permitted to profit from their wrongs
and also an expression of the penological concept which provides that victims
expect and are entitled to retributive satisfaction from our criminal justice
system." Id. at 727, 573 N.E.2d at 548, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 460. (citations
omitted). In its determination that the statute was narrowly tailored to meet
this state interest the court stated that the statute:
creates a unique and identifiable resource and preserves it for the benefit
of victim's equitable right to be compensated from moneys earned by a
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The defendants in this case specifically raised a State
Constitutional argument stating that the statute violated the State
Constitutional Guarantee of free speech.172 Petitioners alleged
that "where free expression is at stake, article I, section 8 of the
New York State Constitution demands a genuinely close fit
between the asserted State interest burdening free speech and the
restrictions imposed by law." 173 Petititoners argument is
premised on the test applied by the court in Arcara, that this
standard must be more burdensome than that requiring the statute
be narrowly tailored. 174 It must be different or why else why
would we use it? The court states: "assuming without deciding,
that [A]rticle I, §8 does require some type of 'genuinely close fit'
between the statute and its purpose, this requirement is not more
burdensome than requiring that the statute be narrowly tailored to
meet its objective and section 632-a satisfies this test." 175 The
court here is beginning to to depart from where they went in
Arcara; the language they used was no more burdensome than the
narrowly tailored test.
So, now we are starting to look at it from a different approach.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed Children
of Petromelis1 76 on Federal Constitutional grounds and remanded
it back to the New York Court of Appeals. Now there is no State
Constitutional law issue because the party asserting their rights
criminal as a result of the victimization. It creates a unique and
identifiable resource and preserves it for the benefit of victims directly
injured by a crime to compensate them for the damages sustained, gives
them priority over the criminal's other creditors and extends the time
within which a claim to the proceeds may be asserted by a victim. The
statute regulates only the criminal's receipt of money, not the right to
speak about the crime and it does not impose a forfeiture of all profits it merely delays payment.
Id. at 729-30, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462. See N.Y. EXEC.

LAW § 632-a (11) (e) (McKinney 1996).
172. Id. at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.

173. Id. (citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492,
510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986)).
174. Id. at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
175. Id.

176. 502 U.S. 1025 (1992).
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has won, so the state can do nothing further. The court simply

drafts a short opinion in favor of the plaintiff. 177
In Matter of Holtzman, 17 8 a district attorney sent a letter to one
of the judicial committees and then released the letter to the press

accusing a judge of "making the victim assume the position she
was forced to take when she was sexually assaulted" in
chambers. 179 In addition, the district attorney strongly attacked
the actions of the judge. 180 There have been investigations that
showed that these allegations were not true. 18 1 Subsequently, the

district attorney in Holtzman, was charged with violating the
182

disciplinary rules.
Once in the lawyer conduct system, the district attorney, was

admonished

in

a private

letter which she

subsequently

appealed. 1 83

Although the attorney faced three charges, 184 only
one charge made it to the court of appeals. This charge involved

the attorney's conduct reflecting on her "unfitness to practice
law" because she released the letter concerning the Judge, which
the disciplinary committee alleged, she should have known was
177. 79 N.Y.2d 972, 592 N.E.2d 796, 556 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1992).
178. 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991) (holding that an attorney "had engaged in
conduct that adversely reflected on her fitness to practice law in releasing a
false accusation of misconduct against [a judge]"). Id. at 189, 193, 577
N.E.2d at 32, 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41, 43.
179. Id. at 188, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
180. Id. at 188-89, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
181. Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. Of the three charges, the attorney faced under the Disciplinary
Rules, the first and only charge which was heard on appeal, specifically
alleged that the attorney had "engaged in conduct that adversely reflected on
her fitness to practice law in releasing a false accusation of misconduct against
[the] Judge." Id. The second charge involved the attorney's "subsequent
videotaping of the complaining witness's statement under oath, and release of a
portion of the audio tape to the media, despite [the attorney's] knowledge that
the complainant would be a necessary witness in other investigations." Id.
Finally, the third charge involved the further demeaning of the Judge, when
the attorney stated at a press release that she "had knowledge of other
allegations of misconduct involving the Judge." Id.
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false. 185 The court of appeals, in upholding the attorney's
violation of the disciplinary rules, found that a reasonable lawyer
should know that the release of false allegations about a judge
will be considered in determining the attorney's fitness to practice
law. 186 The court rejected the attorney's argument that "her
conduct would not be actionable under the 'constitutional malice'
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan." 187 In essence, the attorney argued that because
her comments were directed at a judge, the standard for a public
figure and public matter should be applicable. 188 However, the
court of appeals declined to "extendI the Sullivan standard to
lawyer discipline" 189 because "[iln order to adequately protect
the public interest and maintain the integrity of the judicial
system, there must be an objective standard of what a reasonable
attorney would do in similar circumstances." 190 It seems that the
court of appeals is finding a compelling state interest served by
narrowly tailored means to punish the attorney for her
conduct. 191 Interestingly, the court in Holtzman did not entertain
any discussions about free speech and the protections which are
afforded under such a right as was done for John Peter Zenger.
Thus, the attorney in Holtznan lost when faced with such an
185. Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
186. Id. at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The court found

that "[riather than an absolute prohibition on broad standards, the guiding
principle must be whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its
ethical strictures, would have notice of what conduct is proscribed." Id.
(citations omitted).

187. Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42. (citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
188. Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33-34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43. The
attorney's contention that her actions "would not be actionable under the
'constitutional malice' standard," if accepted, "would immunize all
accusations, however, reckless or irresponsible, from censure as long as the
attorney uttering them did not actually entertain serious doubts as the their
truth." Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 192-93, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43. The court of
appeals reasoned that "[i]t is the reasonableness of the belief, not the state of
mind of the attorney, that is determinative."
191. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

57

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1996], Art. 4

TOURO LAW REVIEW

116

[Vol 13

objective standard for discipline of a lawyer rather than a
freedom of speech standard. 192
The next case we will discuss is 600 West 115th Street v. Von
Gutfeld. 19 3 This case involved allegations of defamation and was
analyzed by the New York Court of Appeals according to some
of the precedents set forth in Immuno. The plaintiff in Von
Gutfeld alleged that the defendant made certain defamatory
statements when he voiced his opposition to plaintiff's application
to open a sidewalk cafe in defendant's apartment building during
194
a public hearing.
At the hearing, Von Gutfeld complained of numerous problems
caused by the restaurant, such as unpleasant smells, parking
congestion and the general denigration of the building. 195 In
reference to the proposed sidewalk cafe, he also went on to state:
"Why do they want to do it? Because they have an illegal lease
with Coronet [plaintiff's prior landlord] that said they could take
the sidewalk. Therefore, this entire lease and proposition . . . is
as fraudulent as you can get and it smells of bribery and
corruption." 196 He then concluded by stating that the Board of
Managers had not authorized the addition of a sidewalk cafe and
that they "sure as hell are not going to grant it now." ' 19 7 This
action was commenced when the Community Board subsequently
denied plaintiff's building application. 198
Immuno involved an allegation, contained in a letter to the
editor, stating that the company was attempting to move its
operations to South Africa in order to bypass the restrictions on
chimpanzee research which existed in the United States.
192. Id. at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
193. 80 N.Y.2d 130, 603 N.E.2d 930, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825 (granting the

defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that his comments at
a public hearing, where he alleged that the plaintiffs building permit was
fraudulent, smelled of bribery and corruption, and ought not to be granted
because the plaintiffs restaurant denigrated the building, were constitutionally
protected opinion as opposed to potentially defamatory statements of fact).

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

133-35, 603 N.E.2d at 931-32, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27.
133, 603 N.E.2d at 931, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
134-35, 603 N.E.2d at 931-32, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27.
135, 603 N.E.2d at 932, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
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Alternatively, in Von Gutfeld, we had a private individual stating
his personal beliefs at a public meeting. The defendant, Von
Gutfeld, argued that his statements were protected speech under
both the Federal and State Constitutions and moved for summary
judgment. 199 The New York Court of Appeals began its analysis
by stating that it would be considering the state and federal
claims separately. 20 0 The court has determined that these are two
different claims and that the bar needs to be educated to think of
them as separate.
The court began its analysis with the Federal Constitutional
issue and detailing the federal test. 20 1 Pursuant to this test, the

court must first define the words as they are commonly
understood, and then determine whether they are subject to
verification. The third and final step is an examination of the
general tenor of the entire expression. This final step resulted
from the Supreme Court decision in Milkovich which eliminated
some of the flexibility the courts had in deciding these cases. 202
199. 600 West 115th St. 80 N.Y.2d at 135, 603 N.E.2d at 932. 589
N.Y.S.2d at 827.
200. Id. at 136, 603 N.E.2d at 932, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 827. The defendant's
constitutional argument which he presents to the court is undifferentiated.
However, as previously stated by this court in Inumno, "the protection[s
afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and that
afforded by article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution [are] quite different."
Id. Therefore, the court's analysis of the defendant's claims under the two
documents will be made separately. Id.

201. Id. "As in Inununo, we analyze first the Federal provision, resolving
the issue according to our understanding of the holding in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal, Co. (497 U.S. 1), and then examine defendant's rights under the state
Constitution." Id. "Our Federal law analysis requires, as we set forth in
Inmino, that we begin by, first, looking at the commonly understood meaning
of the words and, second determining whether they are verifiable." Id. at 142,
603 N.E.2d at 936, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 831. Once these two prongs of the
Milkovich test are satisfied we must next look at "whether the statements are
'loose, figurative or hyperbolic' or whether the 'general tenor' of [the
defendant's] remarks negate the impression of factual assertions." Id. at 143,
603 N.E.2d at 937, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
202. Id. at 139-40, 603 N.E.2d at 934-35, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 829-30
(concluding that pursuant to Milkovidz "[o]nly if the expression fell into the
narrow category of a protected type of speech could the impression that an
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The New York Court of Appeals found for the defendant on
federal grounds. 203 The court based this decision on the
defendant's choice of words, stating that a reasonable person
would not interpret the defendant's remarks, spoken at an
emotional public meeting, as fact. 204 The words he used to
describe the plaintiff do not imply a basis in fact. Terms such as
"smells of bribery" are not terms that are normally used to state a
factual allegation, it is rhetorical hyperbole. 20 5 A reasonable
person would know the defendant was just expressing his
frustration.
The court, after deciding the federal issue, next addressed the
State Constitutional issue. 206 They stated that:
[w]hen the factors discussed above as part of our
Federal analysis are considered under a State
contextual analysis, it is clear that, to the extent
they make up the "content, tone and purpose" of
the communication, they dictate a finding that Von
Gutfeld's speech was a statement of opinion and
advocacy, and not a presentation alleging objective
fact. No useful purpose would be served in
articulating the differences between the two

apparently verifiable assertion was intended be negated.") Id. at 139, 603
N.E.2d at 935, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
203. Id. at 144, 603 N.E.2d at 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (stating that
"given the loose nature of the language, the general tenor of the remarks made
at a public hearing, and the skepticism a reasonable listener brings to such

proceeding, we believe that [the] statement[s] [were] not such that a reasonable
listener would conclude factual assertions were being made about plaintiff").

Id.
204. Id. at 143, 603 N.E.2d at 937, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (concluding that

"[t]his is not the language of someone inviting reasonable persons at a heated
public hearing to find specific factual allegations in his remarks"). Id. at 937.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 145, 603 N.E.2d at 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 833. The court
concluded that Von Gutfeld's motion for summary judgment would also be
granted pursuant to a state constitutional analysis. The state analysis,
established in Immuno, "requires that the court look at the content of the
whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose." Id.
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approaches when the defendant is able to prevail
207
under the narrow federal test.
The court also stated that this more flexible New York analysis
would allow the court to avoid "the fine parsing... that might
now be required under Federal law." 20 8 Moreover, they found
that under a state analysis it is not necessary for the court to dive
down in to each and every word, in order to analyze what may or
may not be defamatory. 209 We want greater protection than that.
Later that year, the New York Court of Appeals, In Matter of
Rowe, 2 10 held that a suspended attorney did not violate an order
of suspension by publishing a law review article and identifying
himself as an attorney by signing the article "J.D."2 11 The court
reasoned that the attorney's actions did not violate his suspension
order and, furthermore, he did not engage in the unauthorized
practice of law. 2 12 In sum, the court held as follows:
[t]he courts may, in the public interest, prohibit
attorneys from practicing law and that prohibition
may incidentally affect the attorney's constitutional
right to free speech by forbidding giving of advice
to clients. Where the individual is not practicing
law, however, [suspended], and "does not purport
to be exercising judgment on behalf of any
particular individual with whose circumstances he
207. Id.
208. Id.

209. Id. (finding that "[t]he state law approach [is] better able to 'assure
that - with due regard for the protection of individual reputation - the
cherished constitutional guarantee of free speech is preserved"). Id. (citations
omitted).
210. 80 N.Y.2d 336, 604 N.E.2d 728, 590 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1992). cert
denied, 508 U.S. 928 (1993).
211. Rowe, 80 N.Y.2d at 341, 604 N.E.2d at 730-31, 590 N.Y.S.2d 18182 (stating that the letters "J.D." identified him "as one who had successfully

completed a law school curriculum, not as a member of the Bar licensed to
practice law"). Id. at 342-43, 604 N.E.2d at 731, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
212. Id. (holding that by foreclosing defendant from publishing an article
the court would "improperly prohibit him from engaging in endeavors which
he could have undertaken had he never been admitted to the Bar in the first
place"). Id. at 342, 604 N.E.2d at 731, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
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is directly acquainted, government regulation
ceases to function as legitimate regulation of
professional practice with only incidental impact
on speech," but rather impermissibly interferes
2 13
with that individual's First Amendment rights.
Based on the reasoning of the court in Rowe, by merely
publishing an article, the lawyer's constitutional right to free
speech was preserved while under the supervision of the
disciplinary system provided the lawyer refrained from giving
advice to clients. 2 14 Consequently, suspension of an attorney
from the practice of law will effectively and permissibly infringe
on his First Amendment right to free speech by prohibiting him
from counseling his clients. 2 15 Incidentally, the court did not
provide an analysis as to a suspended attorney's rights under the
2 16
State Constitution.
The next case, Gross v. New York Times, 2 17 involved an series
of investigative articles written about the New York City Medical
Examiner. 2 18 The articles alleged that the Chief Medical
Examiner of New York City, mishandled cases and misused his
authority.219 The articles led to the instigation of four criminal
investigations into the actions of the medical examiner. However,
none of the investigations produced any evidence of
misconduct. 220 The medical examiner subsequently filed this
22 1
action for libel against The New York Times.
We are back to defamation, back to Immuno. "The issue . . . is
whether plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently allege false, defamatory
statements of fact rather than mere nonactionable statements of
opinion." 222 Opinion or fact? The court says we have a more
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1993).
Id. at 149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id. at 150, 623 N.E.2d at 1166, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
Id. at 149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id.
Id.
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flexible standard under the New York Constitution. 2 23 However,
"the dispositive inquiry, under either Federal or New York law,
is 'whether a reasonable reader could have concluded that the
articles were conveying facts about the plaintiff.'"224
In our state, the inquiry which must be made by
the court entails an examination of the challenge
statement with a view toward (1) whether the
specific language in issue has a precise meaning
which is readily understood; (2) whether the
statements are capable of being proven true or
false; and (3) whether either the full context of the
communication in which the statement appears or
the broader social context and surrounding
circumstances are such as to "signal... readers
or listeners that what is being read or heard is
225
likely to be opinion, not fact.
The third part of this test is where the federal and state analysis
differ. The court, in applying the state test decided the case
against The New York Times. The court stated that some of the
assertions contained in the article "such as the charges that
plaintiff engaged in cover-ups, directed the creation of misleading
autopsy reports and was guilty of possibly illegal
conduct... [could be] understood by the reasonable reader as
assertions of fact." 22 6 The court determined that the statements,
appearing in the context of a lengthy investigative article, were

223. Id. at 152, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The United

States Supreme Court "has recognized that a statement of opinion relating to
matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual
connotation will receive full constitutional protection." Id. Similarly, the New
York Court of Appeals, has adopted "a test for determining what constitutes a
nonactionable statement of opinion [under the New York State Constitution]
that is more flexible and is decidedly more protective of the 'cherished
constitutional guarantee of free speech.'" Id. (citing 600 W. 115th St. Corp. v.
Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 603 N.E.2d 930, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992)).

224. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 152, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
225. Id. at 153, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
226. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 154, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
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intended to "convey facts that were capable of being proven true
22 7
or false."
The court further stated that "[hiaving been offered as a special
feature series rather than as coverage of a current news story, the
disputed articles were calculated to give the impression [that] they
were 'the product of some deliberation, not of the heat of the
moment.'228 Therefore, the court held that The New York Times

published the articles in such a way so that the reasonable reader
was encouraged to be "less skeptical and more willing to
229
conclude that they stated or implied facts."

We are getting closer. In 1994 the court of appeals decided

230
Zaretsky v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.

Zaretsky, the plaintiff, was discharged from his position at one of
the defendant's hospitals after, as president of a related not-forprofit

organization,

he

authorized

a

lawsuit

against

the

hospital. 2 3 1 As president of a non-profit foundation he was
expected

to support

the organization

of the

hospital. 232

Unfortunately, the hospital thought he was misusing funds and
demanded an inquiry. 2 33 In response, Zaretsky stated that they
had no right to conduct such an audit and authorized a lawsuit
against the corporation. 234 Despite the lawsuit, he did however,

ultimately provide the corporation with the records and
227. Id. at 155, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
228. Id. at 156, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
229. Id.
230. 84 N.Y.2d 140, 638 N.E.2d 986, 615 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1994), aff'g,
196 A.D.2d 454, 601 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1st Dep't 1993). Plaintiff, Zaretsky,
brought a claim against the New York Health and Hospitals Corporation
(hereinafter, HHC) alleging that the circumstances of his discharge violated his
constitutional rights to free speech, free association and petition. Id. at 144,
638 N.E.2d at 988, 615 N.Y.2d at 344. HHC argued that Zaretsky was an at
will employee and had failed to prove that "his removal violated any
constitutional, statutory or contractual provision." Id. The court of appeals
dismissed Zaretsky's petition and any right to a hearing because he was unable
to meet his burden of proof in showing how his removal violated his
constitutional rights. Id. at 145, 638 N.E.2d at 989, 615 N.Y.2d at 344.
231. Id. at 142-43, 638 N.E.2d at 987, 615 N.Y.2d at 342.
232. Id. at 143, 638 N.E.2d at 987, 615 N.Y.2d at 342.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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documents requested by their investigators. 2 35 The investigation
led to evidence of several suspicious financial dealings and the
236
corporation requested Zaretsky be removed from his position.
The court of appeals dismissed the case. 237
What the court did, or rather did not do, was look specifically
at the impact on speech. It did not look for any other tests. The
court simply balanced the petitioners' rights against the
defendants' interests in effectively and efficiently discharging its
mandate. 238 This was a new approach for the court: Where you
have an at will situation, you must balance the rights of the
employer, even if a public employer, to effectively discharge its
duty against somebody's free speech and free association
rights. 239 Notice also that there was no state constitutional
discussion by the court in this case.
Next we have a 1995 libel action, Armstrong v. Simon and
Schuster.240 Plaintiff, Armstrong, is a defense attorney who
235. Id.

236. Id.
237. Id. The New York Court of Appeals held that "[a]s a public employer,
respondent, HHC is under no constitutional or legal obligation to retain an
employee whose conduct the public employer deems disruptive of its
operation... [t]hus, when petitioner's constitutional rights are balanced
against respondent's interests in effectively and efficiently discharging its
mandate, respondent's interests must prevail." Id. at 145, 638 N.E.2d at 989,
615 N.Y.2d at 344. (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 145, 638 N.E.2d at 989, 615 N.Y.2d at 344.
239. Id.
240. 85 N.Y.2d 373, 649 N.E.2d 825, 625 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1995). Plaintiff,
Armstrong, alleged that he was retained as counsel to Lowell Milken, Michael
Milken's brother. Id. at 376, 649 N.E.2d at 826-27, 625 N.Y.S.2d 478-79.
Another client represented by Armstrong, Craig M. Cogut, possessed
information, which, if given to the U.S. Attorney, would convince them that
Lowell Milken should not be prosecuted. Id. at 376-77, 649 N.E.2d at 827,
625 N.Y.S.2d at 479. Armstrong drafted an affidavit and submitted it to
Cogut. Id. at 377, 649 N.E.2d at 827, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 479. Cogut then
retained additional counsel, upon the recommendation of Armstrong, and
consulted with them regarding the affidavit prepared by Armstrong. id. Cogut
eventually signed the affidavit with an enclosed caveat stating that his
recollection of the events were vague and that he was unsure of the facts to
which he was swearing. Id. Armstrong did not include the caveat with the
affidavit when he submitted it to the U.S. Attorney, in fact he replaced with
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represented some of the individuals involved in the Michael
Milken incident. Essentially, the claim involves an allegation

which was leveled in a book, (a book, not a newspaper or an
article, but a book on the entire situation) stating that the
plaintiff's client read over an affidavit prepared by the plaintiff

for that client's signature, which exonerated another one of the
24 1

plaintiff's clients.
In other words, according to the book, the defense attorney

presented one person with an affidavit to sign which would
exonerate one of his other clients. Accordingly, this client had
only one problem: the facts were not true. At the end of the

paragraph containing this information, the author stated that this
particular client subsequently retained alternative independent
counsel.242
The issue presented here is: How are we going to look at these
contested statements, and are they reasonably susceptible of a
defamatory connotation? 24 3 The New York Court of Appeals
says it is going to read this in the context of the entire
publication. 244 The client hired the new attorney, all the facts

being present. The court found that those words were susceptible
to a defamatory meaning. The court does not really focus to a
great degree on the constitutional elements of libel and slander;

they found that these were susceptible to a defamatory meaning,
his own note stating that Cogut had a full and complete recollection of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the subject of the investigation. Id. at 377-78,
649 N.E.2d at 827, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 479. The present litigation involved a
footnote in a book published by Simon & Schuester. Id. at 378, 649 N.E.2d at
827-28, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80. In this footnote, Armstrong alleged that the
"quoted paragraph is materially false and defamatory in that it depicts him as
'attempting unsuccessfully to procure the perjured oath of his client"' and was
"published with gross irresponsibility or actual malice." Id. at 379, 649
N.E.2d at 828, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
241. See id. at 376-77, 649 N.E.2d at 826-27, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
242. See id. at 377-78, 649 N.E.2d at 827-28, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
243. The legal question presented to the court of appeals was whether the
"contested statements [were] reasonably susceptible of a defamatory
connotation." Id. at 380-81, 649 N.E.2d at 828-29, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 480-81.
244. Id. at 381, 649 N.E.2d at 829, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (stating that "[iln
making this determination, the court must give the disputed language a fair
reading in the context of the publication as a whole"). Id.
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and off they went.24 5 Simon & Schuster did not get out of that
6
case, which brings me to my favorite case: People v. Shack. 24

Shack involved a defendant who had been found guilty of
aggravated harassment. 247 The defendant was suffering from a
mental illness and was receiving psychiatric help. 248 During this
period he found out that he had a cousin whom he had not spoken
to in a while and who happened to be a psychiatrist. 249 He called

her and she started helping him. She said: "Take this
medicine ...

if you stop taking your medicine I am not going to

help you any more." He said: "I am feeling better, I am going to
stop taking my medicine." She said: "Do not call anymore." 250
He increased the number of calls he made and continued to make
25 1
them over a long period of time.
245. See id. at 380-81, 649 N.E.2d at 829-30, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82
(detailing the court's unwillingness to declare the appropriate standard of
review for defamation by implication claims).
246. 86 N.Y.2d 529, 658 N.E.2d 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1995).
247. Id. at 533, 658 N.E.2d at 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663. Defendant,
Shack, was convicted of "violating Penal Law § 240.30(2), aggravated
harassment in the second degree." Id. In his defense, Shack asserted that the
statute violated his right to free speech under both the United States and New
York State Constitutions. Id. At the time of the incidents in question Shack
suffered from a mental illness and was undergoing treatment from a
psychiatrist in New York. Id. The actions in dispute began when he contacted
his cousin, a psychologist living in Michigan, whom he had not seen in over
12 years. Id. Shack began to call her to discuss his treatment and she agreed to
accept his calls as long as he remained in therapy and continued to take his
medication as prescribed. Id. He then began to telephone his cousin on a
regular basis and would speak to her approximately two times a week for a few
months until he informed her that he was feeling better and had stopped taking
his medication. Id. The cousin responded to this information by requesting that
he stop telephoning her, stating that she would no longer welcome his phone
calls. Id. at 533-34, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663. Shack, unhappy
with this response, threatened his cousin and proceeded to call her repeatedly,
"sometimes calling as many as seven times a day." Id. at 534, 658 N.E.2d at
709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663. The cousin eventually came to New York and filed
a criminal complaint against Shack for which he was arrested and convicted.
Id. at 534, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
248. Id. at 533, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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New York State Penal Law § 240.30(2) states: "[a] person is
guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with
intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm another person, he or
she ... [m]akes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation
ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication." 252 The
defendant attacks this statute in two ways: (1) that it is facially
unconstitutional and (2) that it is unconstitutional as applied to
this particular person. 253 The court held that the statute is not
facially unconstitutional because it does not prohibit speech or
expression, it prohibits telephone calls. 254 It prohibited his
conduct, placing the telephone calls. In addition, the court also
stated that the part of the statute that says you cannot make the
call, without the purpose of a legitimate communication, takes
protected speech outside of the statute, thereby limiting its
25 5
application.
The court said that even if the statute does infringe on speech,
we are going to balance that. We are going to balance the privacy
rights of the individual to be harassed against the First
Amendment or free speech rights of the other person. 256 One of
the ways they do that is by following the opinions of the United
States Supreme Court, not State Constitutional law. The New
York Court of Appeals, applied the same reasoning applied by
the Supreme Court where the "Court noted that in regulating
unwanted mail, permitting communications to be foisted upon an
unwilling recipient, in a private place would be tantamount to
licensing a form of trespass and thus 'a mailer's right to

252. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.30(2) (McKinney 1996)).
253. Id. at 535, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
254. Id.

255. Id. (holding that the statute merely applies to conduct and "[tlhe

limiting clause which expressly excludes constitutionally protected speech from
its reach plainly distinguishes this statute from those which impose criminal

liability for 'pure speech'"). Id.
256. Id. at 535-36, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (stating that

"[a]n individual's right to communicate must be balanced against the
recipient's right 'to be let alone' in places in which the latter possesses a right
of privacy, or places where it is impractical for an unwilling listener to avoid
exposure to the objectionable communication."). Id. (citations omitted).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/4

68

Stevenson et al.: Rights And Freedom

1996]

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
257
addressee."
The New York Court of Appeals extended the Supreme Court
ruling on unwanted mail to unwanted telephone calls. 258 So,
defendant Shack lost on that issue. In his second claim, alleging
that the statute was unconstitutional as applied, "his liability
arose from his harassing conduct,' 259 rather than his speech. The
statutte as it applied to him did not prohibit protected speech. He
called with intent to harass. The jury concluded this despite his
claims that he was calling because he wanted help .260
One of the most important elements of this case is that although
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute on
several grounds, he "did not contend that the Free Speech or Due
Process Clauses of the New York State Constitution afforded him
greater protection than those of the Federal Constitution.
Accordingly, our analysis assumes the requirements of both
documents are the same." 26 1 Free speech, John Peter Zenger,
central publications and publishing people in New York City.
State and federal are the same. We assume it because they didn't
raise it.
Here are some final thoughts and conclusions on all of this, or
what it means in three minutes or less. I would not say that
historical context does not matter, but I think when the court
started talking about John Peter Zenger and jumped to 1980 it
missed a little bit. In the middle, we have cases like Commercial
Pictures Corporation v. Board of Regents.262 Here, we had a
257.
v. Post
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 535-36, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (citing Rowan
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 536, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
Id.
Id. at 536-37, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
Id. at 535 n.1, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953), revrd, 346 U.S. 587 t195 4 ).

Petitioner, Commercial Pictures Corp. alleges that the New York State
Education Law §122 violates the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and
press. Id. at 339, 113 N.E.2d at 502. The provision provides: "that a motion
picture shall not be licensed if it is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman,
sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
morals or incite crime." Id. at 343, 113 N.E.2d at 504. (citations omitted).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

69

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1996], Art. 4

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

statute which required that all films be submitted to the Board of
263
Regents for approval before they could be shown in a theater.
The New York Court of Appeals found that this was not an
infringment on the tradition of free speech and upheld the
264
constitutionality of the statute.
We also had a scheme in New York City which required people
preaching atheism to get permits. If you want to go out and talk
about politics on the street and have a public meeting can,
without a license. However, the Atheists had to get a license. The
court upheld this because a municipality can do those things.
They can control the streets, but not the speech. They said as
long as they have some reasonable way to set standards to
determine which classes of people are required to have a permit
and which are not, we are done. Reasonable classes.
So the long history and tradition is not really so clear in
between. It started out very nice, and there are certainly cases
along the way where the court uses definitions of indecency and
obscenity to allow speech. It is not clear throughout all time.
With the adult use cases as a back drop, the court of appeals
has essentially carved out exceptions to State Constitution
protection by saying that the constitution does not apply. In other
words, instead of remaining with a standard type of analytical
structure, and saying, "Here is our test, we are going to apply
that test, certain things will meet it and certain things will not",
instead they simply say, "The State Constitution does not apply."
Thus, they do not have to go through the analytical structure,
they can claim whatever it is they claim. Look at Holtzman.
The Supreme Court in 1954 in an opinion written by Justice Douglas reversed
the New York Court of Appeals decision and held "that the government may
establish censorship over moving pictures is one I cannot accept ... motion
pictures are within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." 346 U.S. at 589.
263. Id. at 339, 113 N.E.2d at 502.
264. Id. at 348, 113 N.E.2d at 508 (holding that "motion pictures may be
censored, upon proper grounds, and that sexual immorality is one such
ground. The standard 'immoral' and 'tend to corrupt morals' embodied in the
statute and here applied relates to sexual immorality, and the Regents had the
right to find that the motion picture in question falls within the prohibited
category").
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Attorneys have no protection to certain speech under the State
Constitution. In Rowe, suspended attorneys got their rights back.
Note that the disciplinary system meets a certain criteria under
the State Constitution, but it does not apply in that situation. In
Shack, the court balanced the privacy interests and ignored any
potential State Constitutional aspects.
The court, ever since Arcara and Beach still seems to be
getting its sea legs. Clearly the members of the court do not
agree. There is no clear guidance on either procedure or on
substance, in fact the standards of interpretation are not even
clear.
Another real problem in this area is that attorneys do not raise
these issues separately. That is something that the court needs to
insist upon. If the court insists that the state and federal
constitutional issues be raised independently of each other it will
be done.
The cycle whereby the New York Court of Appeals decides a
case, the United States Supreme Court reverses and remands it,
and the court of appeals on remand again reaches its original
conclusion, looks reactionary. It looks as though the court is
immersed in result oriented discussions rather than in articulating
a process of principled decision-making, which is one of the
things that was raised this morning.
My final point -- this is almost in spite of any substantive
ideological or evaluative judgments -- is if the court is going to
address the Constitution, it needs to consistently address it. The
court needs to expressly state that the New York State
Constitution provides greater protection in order for that greater
protection to be realized. It should not turn it on and off when it
wants.
I am not here advocating that there should be greater
protection, but they are doing it, they are talking about the
greater protection. If they are going to talk about it they ought to
do something about it. As a final note, this hit and miss attack,
allows for the confusion in the law because very often they will
address an issue under federal law, and if there is no appeal
everybody thinks that's the law of the state. When someone else
raises a State Constitutional issue later, it is going to mess
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everything up. The idea is to get these things all addressed the
first time the case hits the court.
Thank you very much.
Sandra Stevenson:
Questions? Comments? Reactions?
Peter Galie:
Question for the death penalty. Would a defendant have a right
not to have a jury?
Mary Falk:
No, because if you go to trial, under the constitution, we know
that you must have a jury trial. You can not be tried by a judge.
Peter Galie:
You mean in New York State.
Mary Falk:
New York State.
Peter Galie:
What I am suggesting by the question is that they do not have a
right not to have a jury. Another issue is whether we should ever
allow death penalty proponentd on a jury. If a juror is biased in
favor of conviction, should he ever serve on any jury?
Mary Falk:
They should, certainly. There is a principal argument they
certainly should be able to serve at the guilt phase. I personally
would not agree; they should be able to serve at the sentencing
phase but certainly not on the guilt phase.
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Peter Galie:
Is every death penalty supporter, in fact, more likely to convict
than every anti-death penalty individual?
Mary Falk:
I gather that that is the case. I mean there are a lot of studies on
the issue. I do not remember the exact study.
Peter Galie:
What I am getting at is that the court has the same problem it
had in McClesky. You look at statistical patterns and you find one
thing, and you look at individuals, it is not at all clear that
automatically follows in each particular case. If that is the case
we have the McClesky problem all over again with the question of
pro-ness to convict.
Barry Latzer:
Don't we have a few early cases interpreting the state cruel and
unusual punishments' provision? I thought I read a case in which
they upheld the electric chair back in the nineteenth century.
Doesn't that undermine your per se argument?
Eve Cary:
Why?
Peter Galie:
Because it rejects it.
Eve Cary:
There is a circular argument that if we have it we must want it,
then it does not offend. I am questioning whether that is actually
correct logic because perhaps we want it because we want to
inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
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I am suggesting that reason begs the whole question of whether
the punishment is cruel and unusual. I think if you are actually
addressing the question of whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual one of the things you can look at is whether we feel the
same way today as back when we boiled people in oil.
Barry Latzer:
Well, "we" was not the United States, of course.
Eve Cary:
Apparently somebody was crucified in the Revolutionary
Army.
Peter Galie:
In the provisions you mentioned, the death penalty itself, you
might say that was then and this is now, but unlike the national
constitution, we have had eight or nine constitutional conventions
and every one of those, that was up for decision as to whether
that would be continued or not. We did make the decision to
continue that.
Mary Falk:
Certainly an argument. No question it is an argument. It is one
that is made all the time. There are special provisions in most
State Constitutions that protect in capital cases. It is your half
empty, half-full.
Peter Galie:
This needs to be addressed.
Eve Caty:
That is what we are really saying. We are not saying if you
look back what are the attitudes of the people in New York about
the death penalty, we need pronouncements, we are against it.
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We probably will not. The question is exactly what is the current
question.
Sandra Stevenson:
Are there other questions and comments about the death penalty
presentation?
Peter Galie:
I have one, but they are hungry. (Whereupon, a lunch recess
was taken.).
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